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TRANSCRIPT OF WEAPONS OF MASS 
DESTRUCTION, NATIONAL SECURITY, AND A 
FREE PRESS: SEMINAL ISSUES AS VIEWED 
THROUGH THE LENS OF THE PROGRESSIVE CASE' 
WELCOME 
David Rudenstine^ 
It is wonderful having you all here for this very special twenty-fifth 
anniversary commemoration of this historic case involving the 
publication of the article by The Progressive magazine. 
The idea for this conference was hatched about a year and a half 
ago by Frank Tuerkheimer, who is a visiting professor at Cardozo and 
the Hahush-Bascom professor of law at the University of Wisconsin 
School of Law. When Frank was visiting Cardozo last year, we were 
chatting about the case and he brought to my attention that he had been 
the U.S. Attorney who initially filed the complaint against The 
Progressive magazine. He told me that there were some things that he 
had never said about this case that he might want to say. He reminded 
me that this was going to be the twenty-fifth anniversary of the case. 
One thing led to another and here we are in the room today with many 
of the principals who were involved in the litigation. I want to thank 
Frank for having the dominating hand in bringing about this conference 
today. 
I also want to thank the Cardozo Law Review. The law review 
staff has been doing much of the legwork that made it possible for the 
conference to take place. Ian Dumain, a third year student and the 
Executive Editor of the Law Review, assisted me in pulling together 
some documents for my own edification on the case. I also asked Ian if 
he would draft a memorandum detailing the background of the case. 
That superior memorandum, which is very carefully footnoted, sets out 
' This is an edited and lightly footnoted version of the transcript of a symposium held at the 
Benjamin N. Cardozo School of Law on March 2, 2004. Some participants have more folly 
incorporated their comments in Articles included in this issue. See Howard Morland, Born 
Secret, 26 CARDOZO L. REV. 1401 (2005); Ray E. Kidder, Weapons of Mass Destruction and a 
Free Press, 26 CARDOZO L. REV. 1389 (2005). 
2 Dean, Benjamin N. Cardozo School of Law. 
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the facts and circumstances surrounding the litigation, is part of the 
materials distributed to you.^ 
I also wish to thank the Floersheimer Center for Constitutional 
Democracy and its two co-directors, Professors Michel Rosenfeld and 
Professor Richard Weisberg, for sponsoring today's events. Of course, 
I also want to thank the guests who will be speaking today for making 
this conference important. 
I want to spend a few minutes reviewing the facts and 
circumstances surrounding this litigation, and then perhaps at the end 
make two general points that relate the litigation to broader events as 
well. Howard Morland, who will be speaking later this morning, wrote 
the article that triggered this famous litigation: "The H-Bomb Secret: 
How We Got It—Why We're Telling It." It was scheduled to be 
published by The Progressive. The article—^pre-publication—^was 
submitted for review to the United States Government. Once The 
Progressive made it clear that it would not alter the substance of the 
article and that it would not cease and desist from publishing it, the 
decision was made by the government to initiate an action to enjoin The 
Progressive from publishing. 
Judge Robert W. Warren granted a temporary restraining order 
barring The Progressive from publishing the article on March 9, 1979 
and he granted a preliminary injunction on March 26. That was the 
very first preliminary injunction granting a prior restraint in the history 
of the United States. The last episode that involved such an effort was 
the Pentagon Papers case where the judge granted a temporary 
restraining order for a period of days; however, a judge never entered a 
preliminary injunction. About six months later, the goverrunent 
abandoned the case against The Progressive because another 
publication had already revealed the secret information. In the 
November 1979 issue of The Progressive, Howard Morland's article 
was published under a new name: "The H-Bomb Secret: To Know How 
is to Ask Why." 
The case itself will be discussed in some detail this morning, but 
let me make five general points about the case. First, this is the First 
Amendment background: the H-Bomb case pitted the free press against 
national security matters. Although free press rights are obviously 
highly valued and generally bar prior restraints, there is an exception to 
that general prohibition. That exception arises when national seciuity 
matters are put clearly into focus and the court is persuaded that 
national security warrants prior restraint. The only other case prior to 
3 See Ian Dumain, No Secret, No Defense: United States v. Progressive, 26 CARDOZO L. 
REV. 1323 (2005). 
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the H-Bomb case where this issue was raised was the Pentagon Papers 
case involving the New York Times' and the Washington Post's, as well 
as other newspapers', efforts to publish the secret history of the 
Vietnam War. That history was leaked by Daniel Ellsberg. It had been 
classified top secret and after a couple of days of publications, the 
United States of America sued the New York Times and obtained a 
temporary restraining order (TRO). When it was leaked further to the 
Washington Post, the government obtained a TRO against the Post and 
then within about fifteen days, the case was before the U.S. Supreme 
Court, which eventually dissolved the temporary restraining order and 
allowed the newspapers to go forward and to publish. But apart from 
the Pentagon Papers case, the H-Bomb case was the first of its kind in 
the country. 
The general rule with regard to prior restraint is that if the 
information that the government is trying to suppress is in the public 
domain, a prior restraint shall not be granted. If the information is 
classified and is not in the public domain, the government at least has a 
fighting chance to satisfy the requirements of law that would warrant a 
prior restraint. 
Although others disagreed. Judge Warren found that most—and 
some would say all—of the factual information involved in this article 
was already in the public domain. But Judge Warren decided that the 
concepts embedded in the article were not in the public domain and 
these concepts related to the operation of the hydrogen bomb. Or, to 
rephrase. Judge Warren suggested that although the specific technical 
information contained in the article might be in the public domain, "due 
recognition" must be given to the human skills and expertise involved in 
writing this article. 
Judge Warren also concluded that the threat presented by the 
publication was that it could provide information sufficient to allow a 
medium-sized nation to move faster in developing a hydrogen weapon. 
It could provide what he called "a ticket to bypass blind alleys." So, in 
time, that is the kind of claim that the government made and that the 
judge found persuasive for that particular case. 
To put the matter in slightly different words. Judge Warren found 
that there were five members of what one might call the nuclear club: 
the United States, the Soviet Union, Great Britain, France, and China. 
He worried that the membership in the nuclear club might be expanded 
to six or seven members if this article was published, and that the 
expansion might happen much sooner than it would have otherwise if 
the article was not published. 
The legal standard that he applied in the case in deciding whether 
or not to grant a temporary restraining order and a preliminary 
injunction was that the publication would result in "direct, immediate 
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and irreparable injury to [the United States].'"' It was not at all clear 
from prior cases that this was, in fact, the required legal standard, but 
Judge Warren said that was the standard he was using, and when he 
weighed the evidence, he thought that it met that standard. 
The last fact about his opinion that I would bring to your attention 
was how he parsed the various factors before him at the time. He said 
that if he granted the prior restraint against The Progressive and, in 
doing so, made an error, the net result would be injury to what he called 
"our cherished First Amendment rights." On the other hand, he said 
that if he made an error and denied a prior restraint to the government in 
circumstances in which the government should otherwise have a prior 
restraint he could "pave the way for thermonuclear annihilation for all 
of us." 
Under these circumstances, as Judge Warren defined them, he 
concluded, "[t]he risk is simply too great to permit publication"^ even 
though the First Amendment limited prior restraints to the most narrow 
set of circumstances. 
In addition to making these five points to help refresh your 
recollection of the case, let me make two others. One has to do with the 
difficulties of predicting harm that the government or judges or all 
others face in a whole variety of circumstances. The government in the 
H-Bomb case, as well as Judge Warren himself, faced the difficult task 
of making a very quick judgment about the risks of publication. 
Although the government's position was complex, at its core was the 
fear of nuclear proliferation. If this article is published, the claim went, 
other nations may secure the weapon and they may do so much sooner 
than they might otherwise. As reasonable as this claim appeared, time 
disproved its factual premise. 
Thus, on January 4, 2004, Gregg Easterbrook published an article 
in the New York Times entitled "The Atomic Club: If the Bomb Is so 
Easy to Make, Why Don't More Nations Have It?" In the article, Mr. 
Easterbrook wrote the following: "In 1979, a national controversy 
erupted when The Progressive Magazine printed an article describing 
the hydrogen bomb's basic engineering principles. Commentators 
proclaimed that many nations and even individual terror cells would 
respond by building hydrogen bombs. Yet since 1979, no nation has 
joined the hydrogen bomb club."® 
Predicting harm presents, to say the least, a complex problem. In 
the Pentagon Papers case, the government stated that further 
United States v. Progressive, Inc., 467 F. Supp. 990, 1000 (W.D. Wise 1979) (citing New 
York Times Co. v. United States, 403 U.S. 713, 730 (1971) (Justice Stewart concurring)). 
5 Id. at 996. 
^ Gregg Easterbrook, The Atomic Club: If the Bomb Is so Easy to Make, Why Don't More 
Nations Have it?, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 4, 2004, Week in Review at 1. 
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publication of the secret history involving America's involvement in the 
Vietnam War would undermine war plans, sabotage intelligence 
operations, and compromise the ability of the United States to negotiate 
a peace. More recently, as we all are aware. United States forces in the 
Iraq war, which was premised on Iraq's possession of weapons of mass 
destruction, have failed to discover such weapons and the actual 
existence of such weapons. We cannot escape as a citizenry the 
problems of prediction, but the risks and hazards of predictions are 
obvious, and they were made clear in The Progressive case. 
The second general point has to do with the deference that we 
should pay to senior govemment officials and to scientific experts on 
these complex matters that affect national security. The H-Bomb case 
puts into focus the degree to which judges as well as citizens should 
defer to senior govemment officials and experts in matters like this. 
Thus, Judge Warren was clearly in a very difficult position. He was 
faced with a very complicated scientific matter and had before him 
conflicting affidavits and statements offered by people steeped in the 
field. He was asked, in effect, to make a decision about these 
conflicting factual claims and to do so very quickly. In addition, he was 
told by senior govemment officials that further publication would 
irreparably injure the United States and that he should accept their 
judgment because they were far more qualified than he to make this 
judgment. 
The same dynamic was present in the Pentagon Papers case and in 
other circumstances involving national security. A reading of Judge 
Warren's opinion persuades me, at least, that Judge Warren deferred 
substantially to the govemment and that he did so because he concluded 
that by not deferring he ran the risk of nuclear proliferation because it 
accelerated what he called "the capacity of certain non-thermonuclear 
nations to manufacture nuclear weapons.Would Judge Warren have 
deferred as much as he did if he did not perceive the risks to be so 
monumental? There is obviously no certain answer to that question, but 
it is unlikely. 
The point is plain. As we perceive the risks of national security 
rising and the threat becoming more serious to our welfare, our 
livelihood, and our way of life, the inclination to compromise other 
important values becomes stronger, at least on behalf of many people, 
as I think it did in Judge Warren's case back in 1979. Judge Warren 
made the point in the most dramatic terms he could when he explained 
his reasoning; this is what he wrote in 1979: "A mistaken mling against 
the United States could pave the way for thermonuclear annihilation for 
^ Progressive, 467 F. Supp. at 999. 
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all of us. In that event, our right to life is extinguished and our right to 
publish becomes moot." 
Should we guard against such inclinations and weighing of the 
issues? And if we should, how do we do that? I am not going to 
answer that question today. It is an imponderable question and it 
bedevils this particular case as it did the Pentagon Papers case and to 
some extent as it did the debate surrounding the Iraq war a year ago. 
Today's conference will certainly explore these and other 
important questions. To help us to get underway, Frank Tuerkheimer 
will introduce former Secretary of Defense and Energy, James 
Schlesinger. So please join me in welcoming Professor Tuerkheimer. 
CONTEXT 
James R. Schlesinger^ 
PROFESSOR TUERKHEIMER: Our first speaker is James 
Schlesinger. James Schlesinger received his undergraduate. Masters 
and Doctoral degrees from Harvard University. He then taught 
economics for several years at the University of Virginia. His first 
major entry into high public service positions came in 1969 when he 
became an assistant director in the Bureau of the Budget. He was 
subsequently appointed to the Atomic Energy Commission, which he 
then chaired, and after that became the Director of the Central 
Intelligence Agency. 
In 1973, he was appointed Secretary of Defense, about midway 
into the Cold War. Our strategy in the Cold War originated at the 
initiation of the Cold War when the United States had nuclear 
superiority in the world. Mr. Schlesinger as Secretary of Defense 
challenged that assumption and worked on the theory that the Soviet 
Union and the United States were roughly in parity when it came to 
nuclear weaponry. In his view, this required that we increase our non-
nuclear arsenal considerably, so that we would not over-rely on nuclear 
weapons in the event of a dispute with the Soviet Union, obviously with 
a view towards avoiding the kind of catastrophe that would come from 
nuclear weapons. He then championed the notion that we had to arrive 
at a considerably stronger conventional force in our military arsenal. 
He became the first Secretary of Energy in 1977 and remained in 
that position through The Progressive case and had a major hand in its 
initiation. He is presently the chairman of the Mitre Corporation, a 
8 Chairman, Mitre Corporation and Senior advisor to Lehman Brothers; Former Secretary of 
Energy and Secretary of Defense. 
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Washington, D.C. think tank that, among other things, consults and 
advises the Department of Defense. He is also a senior advisor to 
Lehman Brothers. 
I want to note that in modem times, as I see it, he is the only 
person to have been appointed to Cabinet-level rank by both Republican 
and Democratic Presidents—Richard Nixon and Jimmy Carter. I think 
that speaks more for his talents than any words that I can add at this 
point and so I will not try to do so and simply indicate that it is a great 
honor on behalf of the Cardozo Law School to present to you James 
Schlesinger. 
MR. SCHLESINGER: Thank you. Professor Tuerkheimer—and 
thank you for your role in bringing this case to Judge Warren's 
attention. Some of you may not know, but the first judge that was 
approached was in the Western District of Wisconsin. He recused 
himself because he was a friend of the people who worked at The 
Progressive magazine. Thus, Frank TuerlAeimer brought us to Judge 
Warren who, in subsequent commentary, has been denounced because 
he was a conservative and a Nixon appointee, a subject to which I will 
retum later. And thank you. Dean Rudenstine, for your eloquent 
discussion. You have taken most of what I had to say away from me. 
We are, needless to say, gathered here today on the twenty-fifth 
anniversary of the case United States v. Progressive, Inc. Twenty-five 
years ago yesterday, the General Counsel of the Department of Defense, 
Lynn Coleman called to inform Messrs. Knoll and Day that, after 
review, the Morland article contained Restricted Data as defined by the 
Atomic Energy Act—and, therefore, should be revised before 
publication. Twenty-five years ago next week. Judge Warren issued his 
temporary restraining order. Several weeks later, after an offer of 
mediation. Judge Warren issued a preliminary injunction against 
publication. 
While I am not a legal scholar, and you have just heard the 
testimony of a legal scholar, this case has been discovered as the first 
(and thus the only) order of prior restraint in U.S. history. As such, it 
has certainly captured the attention of the press and, if I may say so, has 
won me relatively few friends in the press. 
It should, of course, capture the attention of all who are interested 
in public policy. What we are dealing with here are the central issues 
for a free society: the balance between freedom and order and, at core, 
whether or not a free society can protect itself. 
I submit that these core issues transcend the precise details of the 
case. I suspect that you will hear later some support for an absolutist 
interpretation of the First Amendment. But I remind you that even 
before we had the First Amendment, the Constitution stipulated our 
national goal—to provide for the common defense. 
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1 should also underscore that the Supreme Court has never 
subscribed to the absolutist interpretation of the First Amendment that 
some in the press have urged. One might mention Justice Holmes' 
dictum, there is no freedom to shout "Fire!" in a crowded theater,^ or 
the decision of the Court in Near v. Minnesota, which Judge Warren 
applied in The Progressive case, or most relevantly, as Dean Rudenstine 
has indicated, the (at that time recent) experience with the Pentagon 
Papers case, in which the Court found against the government six to 
three. But the Court did underscore that there was no absolutist 
interpretation of the First Amendment. As Justice Jackson long ago so 
eloquently, succinctly, and pungently put it, the Constitution is not a 
suicide pact.'® 
Let me turn now to the broader issues Dean Rudenstine has 
discussed: the question of nuclear spread, and the broader issues of 
foreign and security policy. The atomic bombs over Hiroshima and 
Nagasaki brought political shock as well as the relief in the ending of 
the war without a costly invasion of the Japanese home islands. 
Congress immediately went to work and passed the Atomic Energy Act 
in 1947. That act specified that all Restricted Data, whatever its origins, 
was "bom classified," and that the Atomic Energy Commission was to 
enforce that requirement. I do not believe that the Congress at the time 
expected that this action would preclude all future dissemination of 
information about nuclear explosives. The authors expected change 
over time. But the Congress wished to delay that dissemination for as 
long a period as possible. 
In the 1950s, there was universal eoncem about the possibility of 
the spread of nuclear weapons and great apprehension best summarized 
by Leo Szilard, one of the original workers on the Manhattan Project, 
who plaintively asked, "What happens when Swaziland gets the bomb?" 
And Judge Warren, as has been mentioned, said, "I don't want to give 
the hydrogen bomb to Idi Amin."" 
At the time. President Kennedy sought to prevent or slow down the 
spread of nuclear weapons. He stated famously, "1 am haunted by the 
thought that by 1970, unless we are successful, there may be ten nuclear 
powers. And by 1975, fifteen or twenty nuclear powers. Yet, then the 
potential spread was constrained by the disciplines of the Cold War, 
9 Schenck v. United States, 249 U.S. 47, 52 (1919) ("The most stringent protection of free 
speech would not protect a man in falsely shouting fire in a theatre and causing a panic."). 
10 Terminiello V. City of Chicago, 337 U.S. 1, 37 (1949) ("There is danp that, if the Court 
does not temper its doctrinaire logic with a little practical wisdom, it will convert the 
constitutional Bill of Rights into a suicide pact."). 
11 Bill Peterson & Charles R. Babcock, Magazine Barred From Publishing H-Bomb Article; 
Judge Blocks Article On Hydrogen Bomb, WASH. POST, March 10, 1979, at A1 ("1 want to think 
a long, hard time before I'd give a hydrogen bomb to Idi Amin. It appears to me that is just what 
we're doing here."). 
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which had its advantages in that both the United States and the Soviet 
Union helped to preclude their associates and their clients from reaching 
for nuclear weapons. With those disciplines we have been far more 
successful (until now) than the pessimists expected in forestalling the 
spread of nuclear weapons. Those earlier barriers have lasted for almost 
forty years. Until the late 1990s, only the five permanent members of 
the Security Coimcil were regarded as nuclear weapons states. 
In the late 1970s, President Carter made preventing proliferation a 
central goal of his foreign policy, if not the central goal. Perhaps that 
helps explain why the President authorized Attorney General Bell to 
proceed with The Progressive case. I might add in passing that 
President Kennedy and Carter are not normally regarded as insensitive 
to liberal views, nor was Cyrus Vance, the Secretary of State who wrote 
an affidavit to the court. 
More recently, the success that we previously enjoyed in slowing 
proliferation has been breaking down. This has especially been 
highlighted by the revelation of A.Q. Kahn's commercial enterprise in 
Pakistan delivering centrifuge technology and equipment, and possibly 
bomb designs, to Iran, North Korea, and Libya. That development 
topped Saddam Hussein's previous success, up until the Gulf War, in 
moving towards the production of fissile material. All of these 
techniques originate in the European enterprise known as URENCO, 
whose centrifuge technology regrettably has spread far and wide. 
It has become a central preoccupation of the Bush Administration 
to prevent or to circumscribe the spread of weapons to rogue nations 
and particularly to terrorists. The concern is that terrorists are more 
difficult—if not impossible—^to deter in the way we deter nation-states. 
Terrorists have expressed their desire to kill Americans and, 
consequently, if they acquired a nuclear weapon they likely would use it 
here, assuming they could deliver it. These matters highlight and justify 
the apprehensions of the Congress in 1947 to do whatever possible to 
prevent the dissemination of critical nuclear technology. The 
dissemination of such information unquestionably threatens critical 
damage to the United States. 
Of course, the 1979 case could not have prevented in any way what 
is now occurring several decades later, nor could these precise 
developments have been foreseen. But such developments, which have 
reinforced our concern over proliferation, do explain the motivation the 
Congress had in its earlier action. 
As Secretary of Energy in 1979, and as the inheritor of the 
responsibilities of the Atomic Energy Commission (which I had 
previously chaired), I could only enforce or ignore the clear intent of the 
law. So the Department of Energy and the Justice Department 
proceeded to offer The Progressive help in revising the Morland article 
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in order to remove Restrieted Data or, alternatively, to enjoin its 
publication if it would not agree to that revision. I should emphasize 
that without the Restricted Data the same political points about the 
dangers of nuclear secrecy could have been made. But The Progressive 
was unwilling to cooperate then or later when Judge Warren urged 
mediation just before issuing his injunction. 
The reaction in the press was consternation and ambivalence, not 
necessarily opposition. For example, the Washington Post, a victor in 
the previous Pentagon Papers case, in an editorial entitled "John 
Mitchell's Dream Case" wrote, "As a press-versus-govemment First 
Amendment contest, as far as we can tell, is John Mitchell's dream 
case—the one the Nixon Administration was never lucky enough to get: 
a real First Amendment loser.''^^ "There is a specific law, the Atomic 
Energy Act, covering this type of information; the information itself 
evidently cannot be characterized as that earlier material could as being 
not just of a largely historical nature "—^reference to the Pentagon 
Papers case— "[T]he magazine, on its own motion, should decide now 
against printing the piece, or at least its troubling sections. It will be 
doing everyone—including the friends of the First Amendment—a great 
service if it does so."'^ 
The Post later would modify its position, suggesting that the 
judge's order was unconstitutional, and the Post began to veer toward 
an absolutist position on the First Amendment. But it added even in 
that later editorial that it feared that the Supreme Court, given what it 
described as its current membership, would not follow the Post's 
preferred interpretation of the Constitution. The Post then again urged 
The Progressive to compromise. It feared that the Court would rule 
against unfettered press freedom. 
It is noteworthy that many liberal scientists, who strongly oppose 
the government's policy on nuclear weapons, were alarmed by the 
proliferation implications and urged The Progressive to back down. 
This included Hans Bethe, whom Judge Warren cited in his order. In 
that order, the judge had mentioned that the defendants acknowledged 
that the freedom of the press was not absolute but he may not have 
captured the imderlying attitude. In the biography of Irwin Knoll was 
the suggestive title, "An Enemy of the State," clearly indicating that 
Knoll gravitated toward the wisdom "of taking an absolutist position on 
the First Amendment." Then he declared that the ultimate goal was to 
destroy the secrecy arrangements of the U.S. government and that the 
govemment was concocting fables about its interest in non-
proliferation—this during the regime of Jimmy Carter, who was paying 
12 Editorial, John Mitchell's Dream Case, WASH. POST, March 11, 1979, at C6. 
13 Id. 
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a high international price offending the Europeans by insisting that the 
reprocessing of plutonium cease worldwide. Carter's reputation among 
European governments at that time was, if anything, lower than is that 
of George W. Bush. 
Whatever one's attitude toward the constitutional issues, I submit 
that Knoll's goals were scarcely responsible positions. The Constitution 
allows the press to be irresponsible—^but not to the extent that it may 
pose a threat to thousands of lives. Here we are in the present context 
some twenty-five years later, and these issues go to the current debate: 
whether one should or should not preempt terrorists or wait for a crime 
to be committed and then prosecute. 
In the current context, one can find on the Internet the formula for 
several nerve gasses, to say nothing of bomb designs. Given the 
possibilities of biological warfare, would one really object (if it could be 
done) to the government preventing the dissemination of instructions on 
how to engineer pathogens like smallpox, anthrax, or hemorrhagic fever 
so that they were impervious to the available antidotes or therapies? 
Regrettably, I would say that the passage of time, which has 
strengthened the motivation to limit such dissemination, has also 
drastically reduced our ability to do so. Given the Internet and the 
extent of international communications today, any national action by the 
United States alone would be ineffective. Even twenty-five years ago, 
the potential of an injunction was breaking down. Accomplices in other 
countries could arrange publication even in the light of a prior restraint 
in this country. Indeed, some newspaper up in Winnipeg published the 
Morland article with its diagrams and there were attempts to publish it 
in Australia. So even twenty-five years ago, the information was not 
something that we could constrain. Still Congress in 1947 could not 
foresee that. 
In conclusion, 1 suggest that though Judge Warren was right in his 
logic, in the law and in his order, time has passed this issue by, and that 
the possibilities of suppressing information through prior restraint, for 
better or worse, have largely evaporated. 
I said at the outset that the larger issues transcended the particulars 
of the case and I urge you to bear in mind on this larger issue the wise 
council of Justice Frankfixrter, "Free speech is not so absolute or 
irrational a conception as to imply paralysis of the means for effective 
protection of all the freedoms secured by the Bill of Rights.''^^ 
Thank you very much. 
QUESTION: At the time The Progressive case was initiated were 
there any discussion about the political ramifications as opposed to 
simply the technical issues related to obtaining an injunction? 
14 Bridges V. California, 314 U.S. 252, 279 (1941) (Frankfurter, J. dissenting). 
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MR. SCHLESINGER: The two critical Cabinet members were 
Griffin Bell and myself, and neither of us was inclined towards those 
kinds of political calculations. Griffin Bell followed his view of the 
law, and my view was quite simple—^that this was an obligation that had 
been imposed upon the Secretary of Energy under the Atomic Energy 
Act and that I really had no alternative but to proceed. Neither of us 
thought about the political implications, or at least I did not. 
Actually, we were surprised at the opposition. While one might 
expect some squawking from the press, the notion that somebody might 
be providing help to some future proliferator in reducing the time it took 
to develop a hydrogen bomb did not strike us as a popular notion from 
which one could extract political advantage. 
If it were not for Judge Bell as Attorney General, this case would 
not have gone forward. When my General Counsel and I met with 
Judge Bell, they were there—^the Deputy Attorney General, Mr. 
Civiletti and a number of Department lawyers. As we waited in the 
outer office of the Attorney General, I noticed on the desk of his 
secretary a sign that says, "First let's kill all the lawyers," said 
Shakespeare in Henry VI. So I picked it up and stepped into the 
Attorney General's office and put it down on his desk, as we discussed 
the case. Aside from Judge Bell, I did not detect anybody in the 
Department of Justice who was eager to pursue the case. My own 
General Counsel, Lynn Coleman, was himself initially doubtful, 
arguing, one, the government had never won a prior restraint argument, 
and two, that this would simply publicize the article and that the process 
of discussion might reveal more information than simply allowing it 
quietly to be published. I have no doubt that we did give a commercial 
boost to The Progressive. 
When he read the Atomic Energy Act carefully, he saw that we 
really had no alternative. But initially, he was hesitant. The people in 
the nuclear weapons division, the Assistant Secretary and the Director 
of Research were both strongly in favor of going ahead. Going ahead 
means that they favored trying to persuade Progressive Magazine not to 
publish Restricted Data. Whether at that time they would have gone so 
far as to say, "Can we get a judge to issue an injunction against 
publication?" I do not know. As a general proposition most decisions 
that I have seen in the government, despite all that one hears about only 
looking at the hard evidence, and the facts and only the facts, etc., 
almost all of them have an eye out for domestic politics. This one was 
an exception simply because there are very few people in the United 
States who favor spreading information about how to build nuclear 
weapons abroad. 
[In response to another question, Mr. Schlesinger stated:] Given 
the nature of the law, the Atomic Energy Act said that the Secretary of 
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Energy, as the suceessor to the Atomic Energy Commission, had the 
obligation to prevent dissemination of Restricted Data. I had the 
privilege, as it were, of choosing between ignoring the law or 
attempting to enforce it. My own attitude towards these issues when I 
was Secretary of Energy was, quite broadly, that we may have a lot of 
stupid laws on the books but the way to demonstrate that they are stupid 
is try to enforce them. That particularly applied to some of the 
decisions that the Congress had written with regard to the allocation of 
fuel, gasoline in particular, during a cut-off of the sort that we had when 
the Shah was expelled from Iran in 1979. So, we had an allocation 
system that simply was irrational but it had been legislated. A way to 
demonstrate that it did not work was to enforce the law. Somebody 
more devious than I might have said that, "Well, that won't work." 
[In response to another question, Mr. Schlesinger stated:] In the 
last decade, and particularly since such countries as North Korea, Libya, 
and Iran have moved into the field of enrichment, and given an attitude 
of less responsibility even than India and Pakistan (whom we had 
previously tried to head off from acquiring nuclear weapons)—^we have 
reached a tipping point in a sense. If we are not to have universal but 
widespread availability of nuclear weapons with all the daily fear that 
that will generate, that a more vigorous policy is called for. One may or 
may not agree with the President regarding the "Axis of Evil," but it is 
plain that in order to head off the acquisition of nuclear weapons by 
other states that a more direct multilateral pressure will have to be 
exercised. 
As to the broader point that you raise, I think that that was covered 
by Dean Rudenstine. As the level of anxiety or fear rises, the 
governments will move in the direction of lesser eoneem for traditional 
rights and more concern for security. And I think that is the heart of 
your question. 
[In response to another question, Mr. Schlesinger stated:] I do 
make a distinction between the material that was in the public domain 
and unauthorized by the government (which was, to a large extent, 
speculative and had not been confirmed) and the material that the 
government had authorized mistakenly. I refer here to two documents 
that were mistakenly put on the shelves of the Los Alamos library. You 
raise the question "was I concerned?" No, I was not concerned. I was 
wrathful. I was appalled. I was angry. This should not surprise one in 
retrospect. The system of classification does not work perfectly. (That 
is an understatement.) It muddied the case. And not only was I 
wrathful, but it also raised a question about the appropriateness of 
continuing to proceed with the case. 
But our position was that those two documents had been 
mistakenly placed on the shelves of Los Alamos Laboratory Library and 
1350 C A R D O Z O  L A W  R E V I E W  [Vol. 26:4 
that they were immediately withdrawn from those shelves; that mistakes 
have occurred in the classification system before; and that the fact that 
somebody might have had a look at them by going to the library did not 
mean that we should leave them on the shelves so that—I will not 
mention Idi Amin as Judge Warren did—but consider Moammar 
Quadaffi. It is interesting. If you had asked us twenty-five years ago if 
Libya would get the bomb, the answer would have been, "No." Alas, 
twenty-five years later it turns out that Libya, with major outside 
assistance, was getting close to being able to provide itself with fissile 
material. 
I also mentioned in that conversation with Judge Bell and in my 
affidavit the episode during World War II in which the Chicago Tribune 
had published the fact that the United States had broken the Japanese 
code. If the Japanese had known that, they would not have lost the 
battle of Midway—which was the turning point not only of the war of 
the Pacific, but also of the Second World War. Happily, the Japanese 
did not read the Chicago Tribune on that particular day. Similarly, there 
may be momentary access to information that should not be released. 
That does not mean that because the protective mechanism has broken 
down on one occasion that one throws the restraints aside. 
[In response to another question, Mr. Schlesinger stated:] 1 think 
that the impulse of the Bush Administration would likely be the same as 
my impulse twenty-five years ago which was, "can we prevent this?" 
As I hope I revealed, I just do not see—given the openness of the 
Intemet, the existence of cell phones, the ability to move technical 
information over phones—that we have that possibility any more. As I 
suggested, I think it may be regrettable that we cannot prevent that. But 
I think what I was saying is that the ability to engineer pathogens in 
such a way that they can be not treated by the conventional therapies or 
antidotes is a high risk to any society and that if we had the ability to 
suppress that information, it would be desirable to do so. However, I 
see no way that it can be done. The Intemet is too open. China works 
hard to prevent information flowing in from abroad through the Intemet. 
The Saudi government, which is a fortress of 17th-century religiosity, 
works hard to prevent the intmsion from the outside world of the 
dangerous ideas of liberalism, but it cannot succeed; it is penetrating. 
These new methods of communication have substantially stripped us of 
the tools that we might have thought we had in 1947 at the time of the 
Atomic Energy Act or even in 1979. 
So I think the impulse might be the same, but it is appalling that 
the information on engineering pathogens so that they are not stopped 
by the conventional therapies cannot be suppressed—but it cannot be. 
The only thing that we can do now is to work hard on bio-warfare so 
that we have partial remedies on hand when that day arrives. 
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[In response to another question, Mr. Schlesinger stated.] We had a 
greater, naive trust in the law at that time. And naively we believed if 
the government were able to obtain an injunction against publication 
that those on the other side would say, "Well, we had that mnnis game. 
We lost. Let us move on to something else." What surprised me was 
the willingness to start shooting this stuff all over the world to 
Australia, to Canada—and I am sure that it would have gone someplace 
else. It should not have surprised me. You do not look old enough to 
remember the abdication crisis in 1936 of Edward VIII, but the British 
had a firm hold on domestic information regarding the scandal of the 
King being in love with an American divorcee. As a consequence, 
under the rules applied in Britain no mention of this occurred in the 
British press. As a result, the Herald Tribune and other papers, 
including the Parisian papers, were all flooding into the U.K. in order to 
provide the information that the British had effectively suppressed in 
their own case. We should have been imaginative enough to think that 
that might occur, but we were not. We were just naive in believing in 
the efficacy of the law—a lesson for all of you law students. 
[In response to another questions, Mr. Schlesinger stated:] As Dean 
Rudenstine indicated, the question was buying time. We had thirty or 
forty years of President Kennedy's fear that we might have ten nuclear 
powers by 1970 and fifteen or twenty by 1975. Remember that in that 
period C.P. Snow said that within a decade some of those weapons will 
be used. We have not had those weapons used. We were buying time. 
Time is not necessarily a concept to which lawyers pay a great deal of 
attention; policymakers must pay attention to that. The lawyers tend to 
thmk of the logic of the law rather than the time dimension of when 
something may occur. The fact that we were successfully delaying the 
spread of nuclear weapons struck us as a very valuable achievement. 
In 1968,1 wrote a speech for candidate Nixon endorsing the Non-
Proliferation Treaty. While I later became Chairman of the AEG, I had 
not been there yet. But I had been the Project Leader at the Rand 
Corporation on non-proliferation. It was important for us to delay as 
long as possible the spread of this kind of information. Dean 
Rudenstine mentioned that the effect was to [delay dissemination]. That 
was in Harold Brown's affidavit. Secretary Brown, who was a former 
director of the Livermore Laboratory, said that it would remove many 
false trails for those would-be proliferators. By having this kind of 
information you can go more directly to the achievement of such 
weapons because you would have confirmation of which trail was likely 
to be successful. We did not want to see that kind of confirmation. Yet, 
the biggest revelation took place in August of 1945 that a weapon was 
used. That was a big step, and that immediately galvanized the Soviet 
Union into competitive activities, although I should not say that. 
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because they seem to have had some information about what we were 
doing well before that. But they were on the track. We mistakenly 
released too much information in 1946 or 1947 in the Smyth report— 
which we should not have done. We released information on how to 
construct a calutron, which was one of the ways that we sought to 
enrich uranium. Then we declassified all of that information on the 
premise that we had tried it and it was not a very cost-effective 
technique, so why not release it in the open literature? It turned out 
some forty years later that Saddam Hussein had a lower interest in cost-
effective techniques than we did in the late 1940s. So before all of the 
latest hullabaloo, in the 1980-1990 period, when he was working on 
nuclear weapons, he used calutrons to enrich uranium even though we 
had rejected that method as uneconomic. This points to an aspect of 
your question that is true: even when you think you are keeping things 
pretty well closed down, technology leaks out in small ways, and maybe 
in somewhat larger ways. That is the whole history of technology—for 
better or worse. 
THE CASE 
Norman Dorsen^^ 
During the H-Bomb case, or as I call it. The Progressive case, I 
was president of the American Civil Liberties Union (ACLU), which 
entered the litigation in its midst. By way of introduction, I will confine 
myself to two brief comments. First, I would like to pick up the theme 
of the Pentagon Papers case, which had been decided eight years 
earlier. The ACLU had been very active in that case as an amicus 
curiae-, indeed, as ACLU general counsel I appeared before the Second 
Circuit in support of the First Amendment claim. Throughout the 
Pentagon Papers case, and in the years thereafter, I never heard anyone 
at the ACLU—^whether a member of the board or staff—question 
whether we were on the right side. It was unanimous that the ACLU 
should have been there with the New York Times and the Washington 
Post and that what we were doing was critical for First Amendment 
principles. 
That was not true about The Progressive case. Many members of 
the ACLU, including some board members, had doubts about our 
position, mainly for the reasons that Dean Rudenstine and Secretary 
Schlesinger stated regarding nuclear proliferation. Soon after the 
15 Frederick I. and Grace A. Stokes Professor of Law, New York University School of Law; 
former President of the American Civil Liberties Union. 
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ACLU entered the case, I spoke in New Haven to an ACLU chapter. 
Many people said, "Are we sure we're on the right side?" or "Isn't this a 
great danger to the world?" Among others, the erratic African dictator, 
Idi Amin, was mentioned as someone who would be able to destroy 
much of the world with the H-bomb. I was very surprised to hear such 
questions from an ACLU group. Thus, even the strongest defenders of 
the First Amendment had a certain nervousness about the ACLU 
position. The case was very serious business. 
My other comment is more personal. It concerns Bruce Ennis, the 
lawyer who, as ACLU legal director, was the ACLU chief counsel 
during The Progressive case and a key lawyer in the litigation. 
Tragically, Bruce died a few years ago. He and I discussed The 
Progressive case many times because, by then, I was president of the 
organization and this was a high-profile matter with high stakes for the 
public and for the ACLU. In my opinion, Bruce Ennis was probably the 
greatest staff lawyer that the ACLU ever developed throughout its 
history. He was brilliant, sophisticated, articulate, diligent, and 
collegial. If I were in legal trouble, Bruce would have been the person I 
would have gone to. There were, of course, many great outside lawyers 
who did part-time work for the ACLU, including Clarence Darrow, 
Arthur Garfield Hays, Osmond Fraenkel, and for a brief period Ruth 
Bader Ginsburg. But on the fulltime ACLU staff, in over eighty years 
there was no greater civil liberties lawyer than Bruce Ennis. It was an 
enormous blow to many people and to civil liberties when he died. 
Bruce's only serious competitor as the greatest lawyer the ACLU 
has developed is Professor Burt Neubome, my colleague at N.Y.U. Law 
School. I have spoken to him about this, and he said, "Look, I've 
worked hard for the ACLU and civil liberties, but there was nobody 
who could match Bruce Ennis, especially for his remarkable ability to 
marshal and build a factual record." Burt was being modest, but his 
comment is an indication of the respect in which Bruce Ennis was held. 
One of Bruce's closest associates, Charles Sims, is here today. He 
worked on The Progressive case and on many other important matters 
for fne ACLU, and I am very happy to welcome him. 
Now to the three panelists: The first is Robert Cattanach, a partner 
in Dorsey and Whitney. He is one of the leading lawyers of that firm 
and has worked on important telecommunications cases and many other 
regulatory issues. Robert is a graduate of Wisconsin Law School with 
honors, and a graduate of the Naval Academy. At one time he was 
Special Assistant to the Secretary of the Navy. He was a lawyer in the 
Civil Division of the Department of Justice at the time of The 
Progressive case. 
The second speaker is Brady Williamson, a partner in the Madison, 
Wisconsin law firm of LaFollette, Godfrey and Kahn. The firm has 
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important media clients all over the country, including The Progressive, 
and, on occasion, the Washington Post and CBS. Mr. Williamson is a 
graduate of Georgetown University Law Center. Before law school, he 
worked as a reporter for the Kansas City Star and as a documentary 
producer for CBS Television. 
Frank Tuerkheimer, my former student at NYU, about whom you 
have heard, was a law clerk to one of the outstanding federal judges in 
the nation, Edward Weinfeld. Frank became an Assistant U.S. 
Attorney, an Associate Special Prosecutor at Watergate, and he has 
been a professor for many years at the University of Wisconsin Law 
School, from which he is visiting Cardozo Law School this academic 
year. Frank is the author of many publications and has received many 
just honors. He was the U.S. Attorney in Wisconsin when The 
Progressive case arose and was litigated. 
Robert E. Cattanach^^ 
1 am going to speak this morning about how the trial team at the 
Department of Justice handled this case. With all due respect to 
Secretary Schlesinger, we were a little more circumspect about the 
likelihood of success—meaning keeping the piece "secret"—at the end 
of the day. Our concern was not about the merits of the case; we felt 
comfortable that we had a reasonable likelihood of meeting the test, 
even under the stringent standard of New York Times. Our biggest 
concern, however, was that notwithstanding success in court, the 
information would be leaked somehow to another outlet. By seeking an 
injunction, we were validating its accuracy and virtually assuring its 
notoriety. Up until now, prior similar publications—even those 
reasonably close to the mark—had been met with a mere "no 
comment." 
That said, there was not much discussion beyond raising that 
obvious point. The top cabinet officers were aware of these concerns, 
and ultimately concluded that the risks of not proceeding outweighed 
the risk of verifying the relative accuracy of the article (and there were 
many technical errors). The marching orders were given, and I was not 
personally uncomfortable with that. 
The practical aspects of preparing the case for hearing offer some 
insight into the significance of the legal test we had to meet. Let me 
start with the affidavits of Secretaries Schlesinger, Vance, and Brown. 
These Secretaries were very well respected on both sides of the aisle. 
Former Attorney General Assigned to The Progressive case; U.S. Dep't of Justice, Civil 
Division; Partner, Dorsey & Whitney. 
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You could not ask for a more impressive array of credible witnesses. 
Some have suggested that perhaps Judge Warren was a bit too 
deferential to the combined weight carried by the Secretaries of 
Defense, State, and Energy. Judge Warren, however, was not swayed 
hy position or title. I think he viewed it as a significant commitment by 
the United States that we had three extremely capable individuals 
putting their own names on the line, saying "This is critically important 
to the security of the United States of America" but that alone was not 
enough to carry the day. 
The specific contents of those affidavits represented the most 
challenging part of the case from a trial lawyer's perspective. We had 
to demonstrate "direct, immediate, and irreparable harm" in order to 
secure a prior restraint of the press. The most that the affidavits could 
say, however, was that if this article was published, it could lead to 
nuclear proliferation. And if proliferation did occur, it would seriously 
and adversely affect the national security of the United States. 
The could/would distinction proved to be the battleground in front 
of Judge Warren. The defendants properly argued in essence: "The 
United States has not demonstrated to you. Judge, direct immediate and 
irreparable harm. The affidavits aver only that proliferation could 
occur, and that is not enough under the test." 
Judge Warren recognized that "direct, immediate and substantial" 
is somewhat in the eye of the beholder. Probably the most quoted 
example of what would be an appropriate prior restraint—^publishing the 
sailing date of transports or the moving of troops—^provides the 
Supreme Court's most concrete expression of what would satisfy the 
legal standard. 
There always existed a logical leap, however, between the practical 
example the Court used in Near and the more abstract substantive test 
for prior restraint as articulated by the Court in that case. Publishing the 
sailing date of a transport is not necessarily direct, immediate and 
irreparable harm. It is information that could be acted on by our 
enemies. Remember, Near was decided in 1931, shortly after a war in 
which the German U-boats were waiting off the East Coast hoping to 
intercept our ships. Those U-boats did not have the sophisticated 
communications or navigation technology to ensure that a ship sailing 
on a particular date would be sunk. They depended on a rough calculus 
using presumed speed and direction to plot a course for intercept, and 
presumably hoped for favorable conditions (minimum escorts, etc.) for 
successful engagement. 
Merely improving the odds that the U-boats could sink the 
transports does not in a strict logical sense automatically equate to 
direct, immediate, and irreparable harm. It certainly could lead to 
direct, immediate, and irreparable harm if the information from the 
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publication is passed on to the wrong people, and if those wrong people 
are in a position to act on it, and if those actions produce a successful 
intercept. That complete scenario, if viewed collectively, 
unquestionably would produce direct, immediate and irreparable harm. 
But just the mere articulation of that sailing date is not in and of itself 
direct, immediate and irreparable harm. It requires a logical sequence 
of subsequent events whieh while probable, are by no means certain. 
The same held true in the Progressive case. We had on the one 
hand a sequence that could lead to nuclear proliferation. While one can 
quibble about how likely it might be that the publication of this article 
actually would result in nuclear proliferation, it certainly could produce 
eonsequences infinitely more sobering than the loss of a single troop 
ship. But, just as in the example used by the Supreme Court in Near, 
mere publication would not inexorably lead to direet, immediate, and 
irreparable harm. It would require also, as in Near, the combination of 
other subsequent events, all with varying degrees of probability. 
The question thus always becomes one of balancing, whether 
anyone likes to admit it or not in the context of the First Amendment. 
Judge Warren was a trial judge, in the business of deciding requests for 
injunctions, which invariably requires a balancing of harms. One the 
one hand, he was looking at the enormous consequences of what might 
occur if the article was published. On the other hand, only small 
portions of the article would have to be restrained in order to avoid the 
potential for significant harm from the publication. 
Herein lies the critical aspect of this case from a trial lawyer's 
perspective. Judge Warren knew that the Department of Energy had 
offered to sit down with the author and publisher to identify the most 
sensitive portions in the piece from a nuclear proliferation perspective, 
and find some way to "tell the story" without having to disclose this 
very technical information. At no time did the United States take the 
position that the author could not tell the story that, at least in the 
author's mind, nuclear seerecy was a myth. The government was only 
seeking to redact key technical and scientific phrases. In that respect, 
this case was fundamentally different from the New York Times-
Pentagon Papers case. Nevertheless, the Progressive and Mr. Morland 
declined to engage in any process toward compromise, adopting Justice 
Black's absolutist interpretation of the First Amendment. 
Judge Warren was then required to weigh national seeurity 
concerns about nuclear proliferation against the need to disclose 
extremely sensitive technical information which, 1 would respectfully 
submit, was to most objective minds at best a footnote to the bigger 
"story" Mr. Morland wanted to tell. Frankly, the article easily could 
have been published and conveyed the author's message without getting 
into the details of the actual secrets themselves. The article did not need 
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to include everything the author learned about the actual design aspects 
of the H-bomb in order to make its point. One of our key objectives 
was to make sure that Judge Warren clearly understood this distinction, 
and I personally believe that it formed a substantial part of the basis for 
his decision. 
Judge Warren recognized that a myopic focus on the terms "direct, 
immediate and irreparable" could lead to a misinterpretation of the 
standard that the United States Supreme Court intended to establish in 
Near. In that sense. Judge Warren grasped the essence of the policy 
tensions inherent in all of the First Amendment cases, and balanced 
those policies in a very practical way to decide the Progressive case. 
As you all probably know, the case ultimately became moot. The 
essence of the article was published elsewhere, and the United States 
had no real option other than to dismiss the case. Before that occurred, 
however, there was a lot of consternation within the Department of 
Justice as it became increasingly evident during the pendency of the 
case that more and more parts of this sensitive technical material were 
probably already in the public domain—albeit not in a context that an 
uninformed reader would readily piece together. As this case drew 
more attention it spawned a form of academic challenge to certain 
physicists, prompting them to search for pieces of the technical 
information in the public domain, which, but for the litigation, 
otherwise would have passed unnoticed. Each time some small piece of 
the mosaic was discovered by a scientist sympathetic to the author, his 
lawyers would promptly file a motion to dismiss as moot, and the 
govemment then had to explain why that small piece did not in itself 
disclose the secret of the H-bomb. 
Ultimately, the govemment had to abandon the case because 
keeping the secret—defined as the critical mass of technical information 
sufficiently accurate and meaningful to assist other nations intent on 
obtaining a nuclear capability—^was a cause not well served by the 
litigation. Not because the legal theory behind the case was weak, but 
because the case was focusing too much attention on the topic. 
Specifically, the case was highlighting various technical details found in 
the public domain that—but for the ongoing litigation—could have been 
dismissed with a mere "no comment." In hindsight, had the United 
States been able to foresee the constant stream of technical sniping by 
very able physicists upset with the mere specter of a prior restraint, I 
suspect a "no comment" response at the outset of the case might have 
been given considerably more thought. 
What have we leamed? Two things; One, the United States must 
exercise its prosecutorial discretion very carefully. Sworn statements 
by the Secretaries of Defense, State, and Energy that a potential 
publication poses a severe threat to the national security can place an 
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enormous burden on a federal district judge. Unless exercised with 
great restraint, this powerful tool can quickly lose its credibility and 
thus utility, as we witnessed in the aftermath of the New York Times 
case. Second, whatever the challenges may have been of keeping any 
information truly "secret" twenty-five years ago, the notion of keeping 
anything secret once it has been disclosed in any context is virtually 
impossible in today's internet world. 
For better or worse, to the extent that publication of information 
threatens the security of the United States, the security interests of the 
country are best served—and as a practical matter depend upon—the 
sound judgment of responsible journalists. 
Brady Williamson^'' 
When this ease arose much like a summer storm in the spring of 
1979, I was one year removed from Georgetown Law School, and a 
very young associate at a very small law firm in Madison, Wisconsin. 
When I left Georgetown to go to Madison, some of my colleagues 
reacted with amusement. What a wonderful place to live—the capitol, 
the lakes, the university—^but, of course, you will not have cases as 
interesting as the ones we have on Wall Street, or in the big 
Washington, D.C. firms. I still remember those words now twenty-five 
years later. 
This distinguished law school has brought us together for an 
anniversary; it is an anniversary of a lawsuit about a magazine article. 
Anniversaries of almost any kind present an occasion to remark on what 
has changed and what remains the same. So, I will talk briefly about 
what has and what has not changed. 
Changed: Idi Amin, the ruthless dictator cited as a potential 
beneficiary of the secrets of the article, is long gone. Although, as 
Secretary Schlesinger rightly notes, others have replaced him as icons of 
terror. Other principals in the lawsuit have passed away as well. I think 
it appropriate, as Mr. Dorsen did, to note a few of them as well. Irwin 
Knoll, the editor of the magazine, has died. Gordon Sinykin, who was 
the senior partner at that small Madison law firm, and was for years the 
magazine's chairman, has passed on as well. And Judge Robert 
Warren, who first issued a temporary restraining order (TRO) and then 
an injunction, and who then deelined to dissolve the injunction after it 
became clear that the secrets really were not secret at all, has too passed 
on. Nuclear proliferation remains a transcending issue for the world, 
Associate assigned to The Progressive Case, while working at LaFollette & Sinykin, the 
firm that represented The Progressive', Partner, LaFollette Godfrey & Kahn. 
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although it is impossible not to note that the nations who held a 
thermonuclear (not nuclear) monopoly twenty-five years ago still hold 
it, and that, probably, no one else has joined it. Whatever the legal or 
journalistic vices or virtues of that article twenty-five years ago, I do not 
think anyone has ever argued that it helped anyone make, develop, or 
improve a weapon. And the two laws that were at stake in that case 
remain with us—the Atomic Energy Act of 1954 and, interestingly 
enough, the Espionage Act of 1917, which was also invoked. Although, 
as the late Gordon Sinykin remarked to Irwin Knoll, the good news is 
that there is no longer a death penalty. 
On the subject of change, what of The Progressive magazine itself? 
Well, the magazine itself will soon celebrate its one-hundredth birthday 
as the oldest political journal in America. It is alive and well, 
publishing in its still iconoclastic and irreverent fashion, from Madison, 
Wisconsin. And in the last three years its circulation has doubled to 
about sixty-five thousand—^perhaps coincident with the current 
administration, perhaps not. 
Bob Cattanach, Dean Rudenstine, and Secretary Schlesinger each 
remarked on the Internet and how it is almost impossible to conceive of 
a case like this arising again. Because today—with the press of a 
button—information, drawings, diagrams, and schematics can all be 
disseminated, not just across the street, or in a magazine with thirty 
thousand subscribers, but around the world. I think that in that sense, it 
is an anachronistic case. But then again, so was Near v. Minnesota. 
Some things that are implicated by this case remain unchanged, 
notwithstanding the revolution in technology. The first and most 
important is the tension between the First Amendment and national 
security. Not only is it inevitable in American democracy, it is 
indispensable to American democracy. I think we have also seen in the 
last few years a continued willingness, at least initially, to accept 
assertions made by the government and to accept them at face value. 
The public, the media, and the judiciary remain willing, at least initially, 
to accept representations made by the government about national 
security. Yet 1 think we have also seen, in the last two years, that that 
initial willingness is followed almost inexorably by skepticism, by 
doubt, by questioning. The claims made by the government are 
presumptively made in good faith, and I have no doubt today, and 1 
really had no doubt twenty-five years ago, that the government's claims 
were made in good faith. But those claims, almost inevitably, cannot 
bear their own weight—^not because they are the product of deliberate 
deception, but precisely because they are made in good faith, albeit 
made only from the government's perspective. 
Secretary Schlesinger and Bob Cattanach both remarked on "the 
magazine's unwillingness to cooperate" with the government. The 
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magazine did not, could not, would not cooperate with the government 
any more than any of the other great institutions of this country that 
practice the profession of journalism can be expected to cooperate with 
the government. It is not the role of the news media to cooperate with 
anyone, least of all the government. And again, I submit that is not only 
inevitable in American democracy, but also indispensable to American 
democracy. 
Several other points are worth noting, because they have not 
changed, and will not change, notwithstanding improvements in 
technology. Consider the challenge to the legal system and to justice 
itself that is presented when you have a conflict between First 
Amendment rights and national security. If I am not mistaken, the U.S. 
Supreme Court will hear no fewer than three cases in the next term that 
test this relationships between the national government, the interests of 
national security, and the Bill of Rights. 
Bob Cattanach mentioned the affidavits by the cabinet Secretaries 
that were presented in support of the motion for injunctive relief and 
Bob, as a good trial lawyer, also mentioned that they really thought they 
had some pretty solid, compelling evidence with three affidavits. 
Imagine our position on the other side, when we received affidavits 
from the Secretaries of Defense and Energy, and other cabinet officers. 
Of course, the problem is inherent in the form: an affidavit, which can 
only get you so far in court, is, by definition, not tested by the great 
engine of cross examination. An affidavit cannot be. In a national 
security case, the affiants become even more removed from the normal 
fact finding process. We have seen that use of affidavits again in the 
last six months or year in this country, when the government—no doubt 
motivated by good faith—has made representations that are, at least on 
paper and for the immediate time, irrefutable. 
In that same vein, let me add one more point about the lawyer-
client relationship. In The Progressive ease, the lawyers for the 
defendants were unable to share important facts about the ease with 
their own clients. All of the lawyers voluntarily (to be sure) accepted 
the review that comes with something called a "Q clearance," which 
involves access to nuclear information. Irwin Knoll and the others 
connected with the magazine refused to submit themselves to a security 
clearance. As a result, we were unable to share information with them. 
Today, we may have the converse—clients unable to eommunicate with 
lawyers, or to communicate with their lawyers only on a very limited 
basis. This is another example of the challenges to the legal system 
when national security and the legal process collide. 
One final point must be made about the challenges presented to 
judges and the judiciary. Whether the First Amendment is absolute or 
not, or whether the First Amendment admits of minor exceptions, the 
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tension between the national government and the news media cannot be 
resolved by balance. Because if the test is "shall we balance one against 
the other?" the result inevitably will be the result reached by Judge 
Warren. In the face of those well grounded, well meaning affidavits 
fi-om much of the President's cabinet, the fate of a small ideological 
magazine in Madison, Wisconsin does not fare well in that balance. 
The burdens that the law places on a prior restraint are massive. I thinic 
the lesson for today and the future is that we hope that judges, and 
federal judges particularly, will put as much weight on the words of the 
Pentagon Papers decision as they do on the words of the affidavits that 
are presented in good faith by the government of the United States. 
I will finish with a brief anecdote about Judge Warren, and a 
quotation fi"om one of his decisions. Interviewed twenty years after the 
fact. Judge Warren is reported to have said that he would still stand by 
his decision, but that he did believe that the govemment, intentionally or 
not, had misled him a bit. He expressed disappointment that the 
govemment did not pursue the case to the end or at least to the U.S. 
Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit. In other words, he said that 
he still felt that he had done the right thing, given the balance. In 1991, 
I argued another case in fi-ont of Judge Warren, and it had to do with a 
speech code that the University of Wisconsin had imposed on its student 
body. The speech code permitted the University to punish students for 
using language that we would characterize as insensitive, intemperate, 
even bigoted. Students were actually suspended for using this kind of 
offensive language. Judge Warren, in one of his last decisions and 
without much hesitation, stmck down that speech code. Let me 
conclude with the words from this decision, which I wish that he had 
written twenty-five years ago. This is from Judge Warren: 
The founding fathers of this nation produeed a remarkable document 
in the Constitution, but it was ratified only with the promise of the 
Bill of Rights. The First Amendment is central to our concept of 
freedom. The God given, unalienable rights that the infant nation 
rallied to in the Declaration can be preserved only if those rights are 
applied rigorously. Freedom of speech is almost absolute in our 
land, but content based prohibitions, such as the University rule, 
however well intended, simply cannot survive the scrutiny which our 
Constitution demands.'^ 
18 The UWM Post, Inc. v. Board of Regents of University of Wisconsin System, 774 F Supp 
1163, 1181 (D. Wis. 1991). 
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Frank TuerkheimeF^ 
I would like to present a slightly different perspeetive on The 
Progressive case as it unfolded twenty-five years ago. I was the United 
States Attorney in the Western District of Wisconsin at the time. 
Parenthetically, when we left New York City for Wisconsin almost ten 
years earlier, several friends warned me that nothing important ever 
happened there. 
Bob Cattanach and two of his colleagues came to Madison on a 
Thursday evening and were ready to ask for injunctive relief against The 
Progressive magazine to stop it from publishing the Morland article. I 
had no advance knowledge that the case was coming and so, of course, 
was totally unfamiliar with it. At the time, there was only one judge in 
the Western District of Wisconsin, Judge James Doyle; the case would 
normally have been heard by him. I knew he would ask many 
questions, and I felt that the government's interest in the case being 
presented effectively would be better served if these attorneys, who had 
spent himdreds of hours in preparing for it, were to appear for the 
United States, instead of someone such as myself who had spent less 
than an hour getting briefed on it. While I would have argued it if they 
had asked, I suggested they do so, and they agreed. 
At this stage, I had no hesitation in advocating the case for the 
government. The ease for injunctive relief was based on three concepts: 
(1) that there was technical information relating to thermonuclear 
weaponry in the article; (2) that this technical information was not in the 
public domain; and (3) that dissemination of this information would 
severely injure the United States in its effort to curtail the spread of 
thermonuclear weaponry. As it turned out. Judge Doyle had a prior 
connection with The Progressive, and so he recused himself from the 
case. It was then assigned to Judge Warren in the Eastern District of 
Wisconsin, who was to sit by designation in the Western District. Judge 
Warren scheduled a hearing for a temporary restraining order, a form of 
injimctive relief available before the request for a preliminary injunction 
is considered, for the following day. 
I thought that since I was going to become involved in the case, it 
would be a good idea for me to leam a little bit about it. So, on that 
Friday morning, while Bob Cattanach and his colleagues were asking 
for a temporary restraining order from Judge Warren, I reviewed the 
file. 
One of the first documents I looked at was the affidavit of John 
Griffin, the head of the classification section of the Department of 
19 U.S. Attorney involved in The Progressive ease, Western District of Wisconsin; Visiting 
Professor of Law, Benjamin N. Cardozo School of Law. 
WEAPONS OF MASS DESTRUCTION 
Energy, whose affidavit established a key link in the case for injunctive 
relief: that the restricted data in the article was not in the public domain. 
The affidavits from the Secretaries of Defense and State, which we have 
heard about, established the injury to U.S. foreign policy objectives 
should the article be published in its planned form.^o Nevertheless, 
those conclusions were based on the unavailability to the public of 
technical data in the article. The Griffin affidavit supplied this critical 
predicate. Mr. Griffin, in his affidavit, swore that he and his office were 
abreast of public domain articles relating to the design, operation, 
storage, and employment of nuclear weapons and that, to his 
knowledge, the restricted data information contained in the manuscript 
concerning the design and operation of a thermonuclear weapon was not 
in the public domain. 
With the Griffin affidavit in mind, I started to read the article. 
Restricted data, namely those parts of the article which Griffin swore 
were not in the public domain, were boxed, and marked RD. Not 
long after having started the article and having seen what was marked 
restricted data, I was, to put it mildly, jolted. I saw that there was 
information in those boxes that was not new to me; in fact, I had known 
it for literally twenty-five years. As a teenager in the mid 1950s, 1 was 
interested in atomic physics and had read avidly in the area. Among the 
information marked "restricted data" was information I had learned 
from books taken out of the public library in the early/mid 1950s, here 
in New York City on St. Nicholas Avenue and 161st Street. What kind 
of things am I talking about? For example, a thermonuclear weapon is 
detonated by the energy that comes from a fission bomb. The bombs 
dropped on Hiroshima and Nagasaki and conventionally (and somewhat 
imprecisely in a thermonuclear age) known as atomic bombs, when they 
explode, release energy which is the trigger that starts the process that 
fuses hydrogen. The resulting release of energy from the fusion of 
hydrogen into a heavier element is what is conventionally known as the 
hydrogen bomb. Griffin marked that statement as restricted and swore 
that it was not in the public domain. As I continued to read, other bits 
of restricted data were also familiar to me, and therefore, obviously in 
the public domain. 
I then went to court and got there just as Judge Warren granted the 
temporary restraining order. (He was later to issue a prelimina.ry 
injunction.) Bob and his two colleagues were elated, and while 
congratulating each other on their success, along comes Mr. Good News 
to say to them, "Hey, we've got a problem." I told them that there was 
material in the article marked as restricted data which was in the public 
20 These impressive affidavits and ensuing publication of the Morland article 
notwithstanding, in the twenty-five years since publication, no new nation has joined the 
exclusive thermonuclear club. 
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domain and that the classification was way too over-broad. 1 can only 
describe their reaction with the oxymoronic statement that they looked 
at me with what I would call respectful disdain. I siuely could 
understand that. Who was 1? Not a scientist, just a lawyer from 
Madison, Wisconsin. On the other side was the whole apparatus of the 
Department of Energy. 1 could not fault them, not for a moment. 
Of course, they were right; there was no way our position on the 
science could change because of anything I said. Then, over the 
following weekend, I went to the physics library of the University of 
Wisconsin, and started xeroxing articles from books in the library that 
contained the same information which 1 had read in the article and 
which had been marked restricted data. On Monday, 1 sent these xerox 
copies to the team in Washington, annotating the articles to the 
restricted data boxes in the Morland article. This showed, of course, 
that the assertion that the restricted data was not in the public domain 
was inaccurate, but now it was not just my say-so based on recollections 
of what I had read long ago. Ironically, one of the xeroxed articles was 
published by the government of India. India was one of the few 
countries with the scientific and industrial capacity to develop a 
thermonuclear weapon, and therefore, a country to which we did not 
want data relating to thermonuclear weaponry to spread.^' And the 
Department of Energy marked as restricted data information which the 
government of India itself has published! Accessible in a university 
library, no less! 
There was, 1 am sure, a reclassification of the article after 1 sent off 
my packet, reducing the restricted data to a degree beyond that 
information 1 had provided. But given this rather imfortunate 
introduction to the case, I ended up not playing any kind of role in it. 
And what 1 had done in my very elementary and crude way is what the 
defense in the case was to do with far more technical and scientific 
assistance as the case progressed. 
On two different occasions, 1 urged that the case be dropped. The 
first time 1 wrote a letter to Attorney General Griffin Bell after the 
defense had in fact shown that virtually all of the information in the 
article was already in the public domain. General Bell had spoken to a 
conference of U.S. Attorneys and had told us that when we initiate civil 
litigation, we should be aware of Rule 11 of the Federal Rules of Civil 
Procedure which required that assertions, legal and factual, in pleadings 
must be well-grounded. I reminded him of what he had told us— 
21 Judge Warren, during an oral argument, observed it would not be a good thing if Idi Amin 
had a hydrogen bomb. (Idi Amin was at the time a ruthless dictator in Uganda.) This catchy 
statement, the truth of which could not be denied, had no basis in reality since Idi Amin totally 
lacked the scientific and engineering capacity to do anything with the data contained in the 
Morland article. The observation, however, was quoted extensively. Who could disagree with it? 
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probably a bad tactical approach—and suggested that if we would not 
bring the case on the basis of what we then knew, then we ought not to 
continue it since in a sense the case was brought anew each day of 
restraint. He rejected my argument and to my deep chagrin, did so on 
the ground that I was reacting to pressure from others in what he called 
the most liberal community in the country. The truth, of course, is that 
no one pressured me. 
Some time later, I tried again, this time by speaking to all of the 
key players in the Justice Department about why the case should be 
dropped. I well remember the interrogation that Deputy Attorney 
General Civiletti put me through—^by far and away the most 
intellectually challenging experience in my four years as a United States 
Attorney. But while everyone else was convinced. Attorney General 
Bell remained adamant. He had made a commitment to Secretary of 
Energy Schlesinger that the case would go ahead and felt that he had to 
live up to that commitment. The case did go ahead until its final and 
inevitable denouement when the essence of the Morland article was 
published later in 1979. This led to the withdrawal of the preliminary 
injunction, the first such restraint on publication ever issued in our 
history. 
What is the moral that emerges from this case? The moral that I 
would draw is that the government, specifically the Department of 
Justice, has to question a case very seriously before it undertakes action 
that would lead to a restriction on speech. As I hope is clear, I am not 
an absolutist who believes that there can never be a legitimate restraint 
on speech. I believed in the case as it was originally presented. I 
believe it is a legitimate function of government to look out for national 
security interests and in the rare occasion when national security 
demands a constraint on speech, the Department of Justice should 
litigate in an effort to get it. But when that happens, the Department of 
Justice is under an acute obligation to look at the case critically, to 
obtain the kind of assurance that any counsel would want before 
advising a client to undertake a position in litigation that puts the client 
out on a dangerous limb. In the effort to enjoin publication of the 
Morland article, the Department should have had its case, all parts, 
including the Griffin affidavit, checked by a knowledgeable, objective 
source. This would have shown that Griffin was fundamentally wrong 
and that a case built on his misinformation was not the right way to go. 
The end result without such a review was that national security was 
not furthered by the initiation of the law suit. The case quite naturally 
spawned a major focus on what was in the public domain that related to 
thermonuclear weaponry and in case any nation did not know where to 
look, it now did. While I am sure that the Griffin affidavit was sworn to 
in good faith, the affidavit, nevertheless was inaccurate; the inaccuracy 
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was not at all far beneath its surface and hence ascertainable upon any 
kind of objective and knowledgeable review. 
Every attorney in the Department of Justice starts his or her job by 
taking an oath to uphold the Constitution of the United States and to 
defend the United States against all enemies, foreign and domestic. 
This oath demands great deference both to client agencies asserting 
potential injury to national security, but also to the constraints on 
government power found in the Constitution. Whether that is the way 
attorneys in the Department of Justice act now is an important question. 
1 have my doubts, but hope I am wrong. 
THE ARTICLE 
Howard MorlancP^ 
The Progressive case was more about images than text, so I will 
use a lot of images in my talk, including stage props. 
My assignment is to answer the two questions on the magazine 
cover: the H-bomb secret—how we got, why we are telling it. I will 
start with the why part. 
I am a nuclear weapons abolitionist, for practical as well as moral 
reasons. 1 want my country to renounce nuclear weapons, unilaterally, 
and destroy its nuclear arsenal. We should then use all our political and 
economic power—military if necessary—to promote a world-wide ban 
on nuclear weapons. 
Despite our present preoccupation with low-tech terrorism, nuclear 
weapons are still the only threat to our national security. I believe they 
are entirely useless for us, and we are unlikely eliminate their threat if 
we continue to operate from our present position of nuclear hypocrisy. 
With opinions like that, 1 am precisely the type person the First 
Amendment was intended to protect: a political advocate whose ideas 
are unpopular with the general public and threatening to the 
government. 
But why tell the H-bomb secret? 
In 1978,1 was giving lectures to environmental activists who were 
protesting nuclear power. 1 wanted to call their attention to the bomb. 
To illustrate my lectures, 1 thought a model of a nuclear weapon, like 
the one beside me now, would be useful. I planned to open it like a 
book and reveal its secrets, describe its power, make it real. 
For example, three nuclear warheads the size of this trash can 
could flatten Manhattan Island south of Central Park. Anything left 
22 Howard Morland is a free-lance writer who lives in Virginia. 
2005] WEAPONS OF MASS DESTRUCTION 1367 
standing would be a tall cinder; no people would survive. This is the 
actual size of a half-megaton warhead, and every Trident submarine 
carries a hundred of them. A visual aid like this would help demystify 
the bomb, show it to be a product of industry, an assemblage of 
components. That was the first why: to promote nuclear disarmament, 
visually. 
When it came time to tell the secret. The Progressive'?, editors and 
1 were confident that, reason two, it would cause no harm, and, reason 
three, the First Amendment would protect us from draconian 
punishment. 
Speaking of punishment, on easels at the front of the room I have a 
story from the Sunday Times of London, October 1986. It is an article 
on the Israeli nuclear arsenal, written with information provided by 
Israeli bomb technician Mordechai Vanunu. His punishment for those 
three pages of newsprint was eleven years in solitary confinement at 
Ashkelon Prison in Israel; his eighteen-year sentence ends next month. 
In this country, with its tradition of free speech, supported by the 
Constitution, we did not expect that sort of thing to happen to us, or to 
any of our sources. 
I mention Vanunu in part as a tribute to the late Sam Day, the 
editor who hired me for The Progressive assignment. The plight of 
Mordechai Vanunu was Sam's final crusade. 
There is a fourth answer to the "why" question which 1 will 
mention later. 
How did 1 get the secret? 
In January of 1978, while speaking to a physics seminar at the 
University of Alabama in Tuscaloosa, I asked if anybody knew the H-
bomb secret. A student from Oak Ridge, Tennessee, answered, 
"gamma rays from the fission trigger set off the fusion part of the bomb. 
[A]t Oak Ridge they machine the inside of the bomb casing to make it 
reflect gamma rays." 
In journalism they say, "Your mom says she loves you? Check it 
out." One part checked out. 1 learned that Oak Ridge has the nation's 
largest H-bomb component factory: the Y-12 plant. 
1 looked up "fission" in the encyclopedia and found that gamma 
rays are the first form of energy produced by fission. They are only 
four percent of the total energy, but four percent of a large number can 
still be a large number. Lawyers do not understand this fact, which is 
why they charge thirty-three percent. Real estate people have a better 
understanding of how to get rich on small percentages. 
Neutrons carry off another three percent. They sustain the chain 
reaction, but when that finishes there are lots of spare neutrons flying 
around. 
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Ninety-three percent of fission energy is in the form of fission 
fragment motion, which I assumed would be less useful because I 
overlooked the fact that all that energy would quickly become x-ray 
energy via the bremsstrahlung effect. I was aware that a nuclear fireball 
is essentially x-ray heated air, but I did not realize the x-rays would 
develop soon enough to dominate events inside the bomb casing, as 
well as in the surrounding countiyside. 
In my ignorance, I assumed the coupling energy between the 
fission bomb and the fusion bomb would be either gamma rays or 
neutrons. 
I looked up "H-bomb" in two encyclopedias. World Book and 
Americana. The World Book article was written by Ralph Lapp, who 
did not know the secret in spite of having published more words on the 
H-bomb than anybody else. His article was accompanied by unsigned 
drawings of obscure origin, which Lapp had never seen. They showed 
hydrogen fusion fuel—tritium and deuterium—surrounded by 
exploding plutonium fission bombs. This would obviously work, but 
there was no mechanism to compress, or implode, all those fission 
bombs and set them off, xmless the entire bomb was somehow to be 
imploded. 
The Americana article was by Edward Teller, father of the H-
bomb, and its unsigned drawings were likewise not from the author. 
The Americana scheme showed a fission bomb and a fusion bomb 
inside an otherwise empty uranium bottle. This arrangement was 
consistent with the gamma ray idea, but the drawing was too simple to 
be the whole story. For example, the neutrons from the fission trigger 
were needed to convert lithium-6 into tritium for fusion, but the heat 
(i.e., gamma rays, I thought) would get there first and disperse the 
fusion fuel before the lithium was converted. 
I later learned that the fission bomb trigger in this drawing is called 
the "primary" and the lithium deuteride charge is called the 
"secondary." Knowing those terms would have told me that this 
Americana drawing is basically correct. 
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My resources included interviews with five luminaries, none of 
whom was both helpful and knew the secret. Ralph Lapp and Philip 
Morrison were both Manhattan Project veterans who quit the business 
before the H-bomb was developed in 1950. Morrison, who was willing 
to spend hours with me in his MIT office, reported that Herb York had 
once told him he could figure out the secret if he spent a year thinking 
about it. York himself met with me several times at a Pentagon City 
restaurant. He seemed amused by my interest in H-bombs but warned 
me not to try to build one. Teller was on record in favor of 
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declassifying the whole thing, but when he learned that I wanted to ban 
the bomb he identified me as his political enemy and made vague 
threats against me. 
George Rathjens is noteworthy in this list. For years, he had 
challenged his political science graduate students at MIT to figure out 
the secret, and none had done it. I was not enrolled in his program, but I 
accepted his challenge. More about Rathjens later. 
1 had many printed resources and, finally, in the spring of 1978, an 
imexpected assignment from The Progressive magazine to visit the H-
bomb factories and take the unclassified guided tours. With a five-
hundred dollar travel allowance, I managed to see six of the seven 
component factories—all but the final assembly plant in Amarillo, 
Texas—and learn everything about them except what they make. For 
that part, I was still on my own. 
On a swing through Boston, I showed my "Segmented Worm" 
drawing to Professor Rathjens. He said, "I don't think this will work." 
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My next hypothesis was the "Keyhole" drawing, which used a 
Plutonium spark plug to bridge the gap between the primary and 
secondary. My first chance to show it to anyone was November 1978 in 
Los Alamos. I had finished interviewing a Manhattan Project veteran 
about his work on wartime criticality experiments. 1 started to pull out 
the keyhole drawing, but thinking it was probably wrong anyway, I 
showed him the Teller Americana drawing instead. Lucky choice. I 
asked if he could add some detail to it, so 1 could trace the components 
back to their factories. 
He pointed to the space between the primary and the secondary and 
said, "you'd need something in there to keep the neutrons off the 
secondary." 
Bingo. It all came to me in a flash. Of course! If it is not 
neutrons, it must be gamma rays after all, just like the Alabama student 
said. While he looked at the Teller Americana drawing, 1 was holding 
the Lapp World Book drawing. If the fins were removed, it became a 
uranium bottle with a pyramid of uranium at the top, a neutron blocker. 
If 1 used the Lapp bomb as a secondary for the Teller bomb, 1 would 
have a bottle within a bottle. The outer bottle would fill up with gamma 
rays. 










" . . .  y o u ' d  n e e d  
someihing in 
there to keep 
















B e T y til I if m - P o I oriii u m Core 
WoridBook 
Ralph Lapp 
1 recalled that radiation pressure bends the tail of a comet. 
1 knew the Lapp World Book bomb needed to be imploded to set 
off its plutonium triggers, and radiation pressure inside the outer bottle 
could do the job. That was the secret. Gamma rays and radiation 
pressure. 
Barely containing my excitement, I showed him the other drawing 
and suggested it might make a good secondary. He pointed to the 
plutonium balls and replied, "They don't use spark plugs anymore." So 
they, too, have a name. 
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I went back to my sketchbook, and by December I had a drawing 
suitable for publication in The Progressive. In January, I sent it along 
with a manuscript to Sam Day. In February, I learned that Sam had sent 
a copy of the drawings to George Rathjens at MIT, who had sent them 
to Washington for classification. Apparently, I had earned a passing 
grade on the Rathjens challenge, but at the potential cost of losing my 
right to tell the story. 
In response to my alarm, Sam and editor Erwin Knoll promised to 
fight any censorship all the way to the Supreme Court, and to defy the 
court in the end if they lost. They would cover all my legal expenses. It 
would make a great test case, they said. With some apprehension, I 
signed on as a First Amendment defendant. John Scopes, the evolution 
teacher in the Tennessee monkey trial, had been one of my childhood 
heroes. 
That was the fourth "why": to provoke a test case and challenge 
the constitutionality of the Atomic Energy Act. 
Because we chose not to seek security clearances, the case soon 
put the editors and me on the outside of a security fence, separating us 
from our own lawyers, who then became potential sources of 
information for me. 
It got interesting right away. 
In a secret, in camera, brief submitted on March 21, defense 
lawyer Earl Munson stated, "As near as we can tell,"—^that is a 
Midwestern legal phrase—"there are three concepts in the Morland 
article which the plaintiff contends are 'Restricted Data.'" He listed 
them as: (1) reflection, (2) radiation pressure, and (3) compression. All 
three are illustrated on the magazine cover. 
The next day, John Griffin, the Energy Department's classification 
specialist, accepted the three-concepts idea, but offered his own three 
concepts: (1) separation of stages, which Munson did not think was 
secret; (2) radiation coupling, which combined my erroneous 
descriptions of reflection and radiation pressure into something more 
vague and thus more accurate; and (3) compression, which Griffin 
accepted without change. 
These three concepts then became the core of the case. I first 
learned about them in September, after the case was dropped, when 1 
read redacted versions of the in camera documents and hearing 
transcripts. In the meantime, I picked up on the notion that errors in my 
description of the H-bomb were a key feature of the case. 
I started a list of potential corrections. 
The first correction came with an article in the Economist 
magazine which pointed out that the tritium booster charge was 
deployed in gaseous, not hydride form. If that was true, the lithium 
tritide in my secondary was wrong, so I took it out. 
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Detonation Sequence 
On February 16, 1979, MIT F^rofessor Cieorgc Rathjens 
sent these drawings to Washington. The government 
declared them secret and filed a prior restraint lawsuit. 
New So//dari/y (ZaRouc/ie) 1976 
Uwe Parpart 
Next, an anonymous envelope arrived from the Naval Research 
Laboratory in Washington, containing a 1976 clipping from Hew 
Solidarity newspaper, a free tabloid handed out at airports by Lyndon 
La Rouche's zombie-like followers. The article, by one Uwe Parpart, 
included an H-bomb diagram similar to mine, but with x-, not gamma, 
rays driving the implosion and a fissionable spark plug in the secondary. 
The anonymous leaker vouched for the accuracy of this diagram, so I 
put the spark plug back in my own diagram. 
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Then in May, a researcher working for the American Civil 
Liberties Union discovered UCRL-4725, a Livermore Lab report on 
Operation Redwing, June 1956. It was sitting on an open shelf at the 
Los Alamos Library; he mailed copies to newspapers. It contained no 
drawings or explanations, only cryptic references to design concepts 
and test results, but the event made headlines and prompted a round of 
political cartoons. 
Most of the document concerned a three-stage device called 
Bassoon which was tested twice during Redwing. Its third, or tertiary, 
stage was rated at twenty megatons per meter; that is a megaton for 
every two inches of length. I have mentioned what three, half-megaton 
bombs would do to Manhattan Island. Bassoon was later deployed as 
the twenty-five megaton Mark-41 bomb. We actually had these things 
flying around in the 1950s, fully assembled and ready to drop. 
They have long since been retired in favor of smaller bombs. 
The government argued that UCRL-4725 did not reveal the H-
bomb secret and that a reader would need my article as a guide to 
understanding it. Legally, it was a "let's see if the judge'll buy this 
one" type of argument. It worked, and the injunction held for another 
four months. 
One thing I learned from the document was that the exotic plastic 
foam, which is made at the Kansas City plant, does not go inside the 
secondary. It fills the radiation charmel outside the secondary, so I 
made that change in the drawing. At first, I thought the plastic was just 
a packaging material, but in August, Chuck Hansen circulated an open 
letter to Senator Percy of Illinois, which outlined his speculations about 
the H-bomb secret. 
The Hansen Letter 
fission tdgg^irs 
These efements are... supported by a casing "filling" of poli^srtyrene or pofyuretfiane team 
jreweatedljyUCflt-4?2&. Odcago ^Js^Tlmes^ May 18. 
Wrong Right 
Two Primaries ^^Ra^ario^mpl^on 
Ho Neutron Blocker ^^^!ocatloa^oSSiP 
No Spark Plug 
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The Hansen letter contained a number of obvious errors: two 
primaries, which would never work because of timing issues; no 
neutron blocker; and no spark plug. It did give a vague explanation of 
radiation implosion, and he got the location of the plastic foam right. 
To accompany his very crude drawing, Hansen included the following 
line of text: "These elements are supported by a casing filling of 
polystyrene or polyethylene foam (revealed by UCRL-4725, Chicago 
Sun Times, May 18, 1979)." Hansen identified the foam as a packaging 
item, as I did, but I soon learned that defense experts were making a big 
deal about the location of the foam. I suspected it was more than 
packaging. 
To everyone's surprise, the government took the Hansen letter as 
an excuse to throw in the towel, declare the case moot, and give the go-
ahead for publication of my article. 
From redacted court documents, 1 learned that the plastic foam 
plays an active role in radiation implosion, and, finally, that radiation is 
"channeled" not "reflected." 
Thus, all my thoughts about gamma rays, reflection, and radiation 
pressure—which the government had tried to suppress—^were wrong 
anyway. My list of significant corrections was published as a full-page 
Errata in The Progressive one month after the unaltered article came out 
in the November 1979 issue. The government did not see the Errata 
before publication, and no legal action was taken. 
Cori-ections 
1. Tritium S as gas, not hydride. 
2. No tritium S in secondary. 
3. U-235S spark plug in 
secondary; x- not gamma rays. 
4. No plastic foam Pl inside 
secondary. 
5. Plastic foam filler^in 
radiation channel, with blast 
shield B. 
6. Channel filler has active role in 
implosion: "matter pressure," 
not "radiation pressure." 
7. Radiation is "channeled," not 
"reflected," 
With the corrected diagram, I now had what I needed to build the 
stage prop and to cormect the components to the appropriate corporate 
logos. Within a few years, grassroots activists had driven all the H-
Win 
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bomb contractors out of the business, forcing the Energy Department to 
find new contractors to run its factories. One of the factories, the 
Rockwell-operated Rocky Flats plant near Denver, has been shut down 
for good, effectively shutting down the production line. 
We have not banned the bomb yet, but we do have this tangible 
result of the exercise of free speech by citizens. 
ia 19%. 
A modern thermonuclear warhead - the W87 
Fission trigger 
(DT) gas roam Uranlum-238 case 
Explosion process: The compression of plutonium with a chemical 
explosive (above, left) starts a fission explosion that, in turn, is boosted 
by the fusion of DT gas. X-rays then compress the second component, 
causing a larger fission/fusion. 
(c) 1995 US Hews & World Report, by Timotl^ ito, Robert Kemp, and Richard Gage 
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In the meantime, journalists and activists have continued to publish 
illustrated explanations of how H-bombs work, such as: U.S. News and 
World Report in 1995, the San Jose Mercury News in 1999, and 
Greenpeace on its website. 
The Greenpeace drawing is imique. Every other drawing in this 
presentation originates outside the secrecy wall, as some artist's attempt 
to illustrate a concept. The Greenpeace Rawing is said to come from a 
British nuclear weapons manual and to depict an actual weapon. 
Activists like to treat drawings like this in the spirit of a "wanted" 
poster. If you see one of these, call a weapons inspector. Do not 
attempt to make a citizen's arrest. 
British H-Bomb 
Posted on the Web 
by Greenpeace 
high explosive shell 
lenses and detonators 
U-238 lined shell 
Llthlum-6 I deuterlde fusion fuel 




.4:'^ end-cap and 
neutron focus lens 
reflector/neutron gun carriage 
reflector wrap 
Pu-239/U-235 fusion tube 
or 'spark plug' 
•• X 
ASSEMBLY 
polystyrene polarizer/plasma source httpJ/afchioe.gieenpMO».oig/comms(nukes(fig05.9i( 
Summory 
Why? 
To Promote Buckar diswmamcnt 
It would do BO hmm 
First Amendment would furotect us 
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SHARING INFORMATION ON WEAPONRY WITH THE PUBLIC THEN AND 
Now 
Gary MilholliiP^ 
I am pleased to appear at this anniversary of The Progressive Case, 
which tested whether information about the design of nuclear weapons 
could be published in the mass media. What strikes me the most 
strongly about the case today is how much things have changed. The 
problem today is not to get information about the bomb out, the problem 
is to keep it in. And the press is essential to keep pressure on the 
governments of the world to do a better job of keeping it in. 
We have just leamed that Libya purchased a workable bomb 
design from a nuclear smuggling network set up by Dr. A.Q. Khan, the 
"father" of Pakistan's nuclear bomb. That design was given to Pakistan 
in the early 1980s by China, which had already tested it. It is an 
implosion device that uses highly-enriched uranium. Pakistan then 
provided the design to middle-men, who were tasked with importing its 
components. The design thus made its way into the nuclear black 
market. The CIA has brought the design back to the United States in a 
box. How many more people have it? We do not know. There were 
also engineering drawings showing how to make it. Will it wind up on 
the web, or perhaps in The Progressive magazine? 
I would like to talk about Mr. Khan's smuggling network and what 
it did. 
First, the bomb design was not the important thing. The most 
important thing Khan provided was the means to make nuclear 
material—the fissile material that actually explodes in a bomb. This 
consists of either plutonium or highly-enriched uranium. That is what is 
hardest to make. Eighty to ninety percent of the effort in the Manhattan 
Project was devoted to making this material. 
Libya had a contract for about 10,000 centrifuges, which could 
have produced at least ten bombs' worth of material per year. Iran was 
outfitted with centrifuges in the late 1980s and early 1990s. Libya was 
still getting things last fall. A.Q. Khan got millions in bribes, built big 
houses, and traveled around the world for more than a decade. He had 
been known since the 1970s as a nuclear thief and was indicted for it. 
He nevertheless succeeded in supplying Iran and North Korea with what 
they needed, and Libya was on its way to the same result. Last October, 
our intelligence agents finally intercepted a shipment. A little bit later, 
Libya agreed to give up all of its WMD programs, which meant that 
23 Director, Wisconsin Project on Nuclear Arms Control; expert on international proliferation 
of weapons of mass destruction. 
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Libya would stop suffering from international sanctions and would not 
have to worry about being invaded. 
But where were our U.S. intelligence agents during the past 
decade? Why did not we detect this smuggling network and stop it 
before it succeeded? Stopping such networks is the first line of defense, 
but it is not working. Networks need to be stopped before they succeed. 
Why is the press not pointing out what amounts to an intemational 
intelligence disaster? 
Sadly enough, it is not an isolated failure. Our intelligence 
agencies missed Iraq's nuclear program before the first Gulf War, when 
they failed to detect the existence of giant devices for enriching uranium 
called calutrons. They also missed Iraq's biological weapon program. 
In addition, they missed Iraq's lack of WMD production before the 
most recent war. And they missed India's nuclear test in 1998, and 
could not find the Chinese embassy in Belgrade. We obviously need 
more accountability from our intelligence agents. We spend thirty to 
fifty billion dollars a year on them and we still don't have the answers 
to the big questions. These are quite simple: How many nukes does 
North Korea have? How much of a threat was Saddam Hussein? How 
far is Iran from building a bomb? 
We have an extensive system in the developed countries for 
controlling the export of sensitive items like centrifuges for enriching 
uranium. But this Pakistani network went around it like the German 
army around the Maginot line. The good news is that the Libyans are 
turning everybody in the network in, which includes at a minimum all 
of Libya's suppliers. We now have a fair chance of rolling the network 
up. And with Libya and Iraq gone as proliferation threats, we are down 
to Iran and North Korea. There are only these two current cases left, 
with perhaps Brazil lurking in the far background. 
Iran is really the big question. If Iran goes nuclear, then the non-
proliferation treaty and export controls and intemational diplomacy will 
all have failed. The Middle East will have another nuclear power, and 
Turkey, Saudi Arabia, and Egypt will have to think about their own 
nuclear plans. Iran also supports terrorism, and has done so for many 
years. 
Iran could take a number of different paths. It could follow the 
Libyan model and get rid of its nuclear fuel cycle plants, centrifuges, 
heavy water reactors, and associated equipment. It would be left with a 
power reactor it really does not need, due to its large amount of oil and 
natural gas. Or, it could follow the North Korea model and drop out of 
the non-proliferation treaty and tell everyone to go to hell. This would 
probably result in intemational sanctions that would be unpleasant and 
perhaps even painful for Iran to endure. Or, it could follow the Iraqi 
model of deception, which Iran seems to be using now. Iran could try 
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to deceive international inspectors, engage in secret activities and play 
for time. Or, finally, it could follow a new model and achieve a 
"breakout" option while staying within the non-proliferation treaty. 
This would entail making plutonium and highly-enriched uranium 
legally under the treaty until reaching bomb capability, and then 
dropping out of the treaty and using its nuclear advanees to quickly get 
the bomb. It may be hard for us to distinguish which of these last two 
options Iran is really following. 
The nuclear weapon timeline for Iran is rather unclear. What we 
do know is that Iran is much closer than Saddam was when we invaded 
Iraq recently. And Iran is probably closer than Saddam was at the time 
of the first Gulf War. Iran's long range missile program is important 
too. The only purpose of a long-range missile is to carry a nuclear 
warhead. The existence of such a program reveals one's intentions. 
So, what is the world-wide threat today? Looking around the 
world, we see the following: 
Egypt, Syria, and Iran can all target Israel with chemical or high-
explosive warheads on missiles. Certainly many hundreds of these 
missiles and possibly as many as a thousand could be targeted on Israel. 
Israel, in turn, can target all of these countries with the same, plus 
nuclear warheads. These nuclear warheads number in the low hundreds 
and are sufficient to destroy every target in the Middle East. India and 
Pakistan can target each other with scores of nuclear warheads on both 
missiles and aircraft. India's expanding nuclear capability will cover 
China soon and may cover the entire world within the next decade 
(India hopes to deploy submarines with nuclear missiles). Iran will 
achieve nuclear weapon status in a few years unless someone 
intervenes. Iran will also continue to develop its missile program. 
North Korea may continue to produce nuclear weapon material and may 
even begin to export it. Virtually all of these capabilities will have been 
built with imports, and will continue to be developed with imports. So 
export controls will be a great tool for slowing it down, and so will an 
effective intelligence organization. We do not have the latter, and 
without it, the former does not do us much good. 
KEYNOTE ADDRESS 
Anthony Lewis^^ 
I have listened with fascination to this discussion and earlier to the 
discussion of The Progressive case, but I am not going to talk about 
24 Former columnist for the New York Times and the author of three books. 
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that. Instead, my subject is where we are today on the issues of national 
security and the Constitution. 
The first thing 1 have to say is that the issues are utterly different 
from those in The Progressive case, or earlier in the Pentagon Papers 
case.25 In 1971 in the Pentagon Papers, and in 1979 in The 
Progressive, the government tried to prevent the press from publishing 
material that officials asserted would threaten national security. 
Since the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, the government 
has not directly engaged the press. It has not sought to enjoin a 
newspaper or broadcast station from disclosing something. Rather, it 
has invoked national security on the whole to deprive individuals of 
fundamental rights. In the name of fighting terrorism it has abruptly 
overridden guarantees in the Constitution and international law. Ideas 
that we had regarded as alien to American beliefs—detention without 
trial, denial of the right to counsel, years of interrogation in isolation— 
are now American practices. 
Let me remind you of one far-reaching claim of national security 
authority by the Bush administration. It claims the power to designate 
any American citizen as a supporter of terrorism, and then to hold that 
citizen in detention indefinitely, in solitary confinement, without trial 
and without the right to counsel. According to the administration's 
legal argument, the imprisoned person is to have virtually no chance to 
challenge his or her designation as a terrorist. Two American citizens 
have been imprisoned in that way for more than twenty months now. I 
shall briefly describe one. 
Jose Padilla was bom in Brooklyn, became a gang member, served 
several prison terms, and converted to Islam in prison. In May 2002, he 
flew into O'Hare Airport in Chicago from abroad. Federal agents 
arrested him as a material witness before a grand jury in New York 
investigating the attack on the World Trade Center. He was taken to 
New York and brought before a federal judge, who appointed a lawyer, 
Donna Newman, to represent him. The hearing was set for June 11, 
2002. But on June 10, Attomey General Ashcrofl announced that 
Padilla would be held without trial as an enemy combatant. "We have 
captured a known terrorist," Ashcroft said on television.^® "While in 
Afghanistan and Pakistan,  [he] trained with the enemy.. .  In 
apprehending [him]... we have disrupted an unfolding terrorist plot to 
attack the United States by exploding a radioactive 'dirty bomb.'"^'' 
That sounded frightening, but there had not been, and still has not 
been, any legal process to determine the tmth of Ashcroft's colorful 
25 New York Times Co. v. Unites States, 403 U.S. 713 (1971). 
26 CNN, Ashcroft statement on 'dirty bomb' suspect (Jtme 10, 2002), available at 
http://www.cnn.eom/2002/US/06/10/ashcroft.announcement/. 
27 Id. 
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pronunciation of Padilla's guilt. At first, the Bush administration's 
lawyers said that Padilla should have no right at all to challenge his 
imprisonment in court. Then it said he could have a habeas corpus 
proceeding, the traditional way to test the legality of imprisonment. But 
the government argued that it had to show only some evidence to justify 
its detention of Padilla—^that is, any evidence, and not beyond a 
reasonable doubt as in a criminal case or by a preponderance of 
evidence as in a civil case. Padilla's lawyer. Donna Newman, filed a 
petition for habeas corpus. The evidence produced by the Bush 
administration in response was a statement by a Pentagon official, not 
subject to cross-examination and without any firsthand witnesses to 
anything Padilla was said to have done. The judge found that that was 
enough to justify Padilla's detention. But he did say that Donna 
Newman should have a right to talk with Padilla, for the limited purpose 
of getting from him any facts inconsistent with his designation as a 
terrorist. The government lawyers reacted to that last very partial 
decision in favor of Padilla with outrage, saying that any visit to Padilla 
by a lawyer might damage his interrogation by destroying the necessary 
"atmosphere of dependency and trust between the subject and 
interrogator.That seemed to me to be a rather candid statement— 
that the purpose of the interrogation was to overbear the detainee's will. 
On appeal, a panel of the United States Court of Appeals for the 
Second Circuit, here in New York, held that President Bush had no such 
authority to hold Padilla in detention. The vote was two to one, and 
even the dissenter thought Padilla should have an unrestricted right to 
counsel. The Supreme Court has agreed to hear that case, and it will be 
argued in the Court on April 28. 
A few weeks ago the Defense Department announced that Padilla 
would be allowed to see his lawyers. It maintained its position that, 
legally, he had no right to see a lawyer, but as a matter of grace it would 
allow him to meet Donna Newman with appropriate security 
restrictions. Ms. Newman sent copies of her briefs to the Navy brig 
where Padilla is held in South Carolina, and the briefs were censored 
before they were shown to Padilla. 
Two hours after announcing that the lawyers would be permitted to 
see Padilla under restrictive conditions, the govemment filed a brief in 
the Supreme Court arguing that the issue of the right to counsel in the 
case was now moot. 
Tomorrow, Donna Newman and her co-counsel, Andrew Patel, are 
going to visit Padilla at the Navy brig. They do not expect to learn a lot, 
or even ask very much—because the Defense Department has ordered 
28 Padilla v. Rumsfeld, 243 F. Supp. 2d 42, 49 (2003) (quoting declaration of Admiral Jacoby 
at 4-5). 
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that a department official be present during the conversation, and that it 
be videotaped. Under those circumstances counsel cannot have a 
candid discussion of facts or strategy.^^ 
The theme of this conference has been national security and a free 
press. You may be wondering what the free press has to do with the 
Padilla case and other repressive actions taken by the Bush 
administration since 9/11. My answer is that the press has little to do 
with them. And more to the point, it has had little to say about them. 
Coverage of the administration's record on civil liberties since 9/11 has, 
in my judgment, been spotty at best. 
1 first heard about the claim that the administration could 
indefinitely detain American citizens by calling them enemy combatants 
when it held the other of the two men who have been under detention, 
Yaser Hamdi. 1 saw it in a story a few paragraphs long in the New York 
Times. I was bewildered. I wondered why that claim was not important 
news. The fate of Hamdi and Padilla has rarely made it to page one 
since then, except when the Supreme Court agreed to hear the Hamdi 
case and the Padilla case, when it rightly was a page one story. 
Over the more than two years since the Bush administration first 
made its audacious claim of the right to detain people on its own 
motion, it has had little prominence in the print, or especially in the 
broadcast press. I doubt that one American in a thousand, and that is 
generous, probably one American in a hundred thousand, or a million, 
knows about the cases or knows that his government claims the right to 
put him or her in detention forever on its own say-so. 
The Bush administration is often accused of unilateralism in 
foreign affairs; but the unilateralism is, to me, just as striking at home in 
the enemy combatant cases. The administration asserts, on its own, a 
legal right to detain citizens without trial. Then it claims the right to 
define not only the law but the facts, because it allows the detained 
person no effective opportunity to challenge his or her designation as a 
terrorist. 
Think about the enemy combatant cases in comparison with The 
Progressive case. Which government action constitutes a worse threat 
to the constitutional freedoms of Americans? It seems obvious, to me at 
least, that our rights are far more menaced by the proposition that the 
government can put any of us in prison without trial or access to 
counsel. 
29 The Supreme Court decided Rumsfeld v. Padilla, on June 28, 2004, 124 S. Ct. 2711 (2004). 
It reversed the judgment, holding that Padilla's habeas action had been filed in the wrong court, 
but in the companion case of Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 124 S. Ct. 2633 (2004), where there was no 
procedural obstacle to habeas corpus, it held that a citizen thus detained must have a fair 
opportunity to know and meet the allegations against him. 
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In the Pentagon Papers case Justice Potter Stewart, in his separate 
opinion, addressed the role of the press on issues related to the national 
security. On those matters, he said, the usual legislative and judicial 
checks on executive power scarcely operate. Congress and the Courts 
tend to defer to the President. So, he wrote: 
the only effective restraint upon executive policy and power . . . may 
lie in an enlightened citizenry—in an informed and critical public 
opinion which alone can here protect the values of democratic 
government. For this reason, it is perhaps here that a press that is 
alert, aware, and free most vitally serves the basic purpose of the 
First Amendment. For without an informed and free press there 
caimot be an enlightened people.^® 
It is not only in the enemy combatant cases that the press seems to 
me to have failed to perform the function described by Justice Stewart. 
Another example is the sweep of aliens ordered by Attorney General 
Ashcroft after 9/11. Thousands were arrested on suspicion of having 
something to do with terrorism. They were held for weeks or months, 
their names kept secret, their places of detention kept secret, then 
mostly charged with such immigration violations as overstaying a visa, 
and deported after secret deportation hearings. In prison, while they 
were being detained for long periods without charge, they were 
humiliated and assaulted. At the Metropolitan Detention Center in 
Brooklyn, they were allowed one telephone call a week to try to find a 
lawyer. Guards informed them of that by asking, "Are you okay?" 
That was supposedly shorthand for "Do you want to call a lawyer?" 
We found all of that out when the Justice Department's Inspector 
General, Glenn A. Fine, investigated and filed a report. He told about 
the abuse of the prisoners. He said they had been arrested more or less 
at random, with no probable cause to think they had a connection with 
terrorism. The whole process of arrests and confinement had relatively 
little coverage in the press until the Inspector General's report. Then 
there were serious stories. The New York Times"'?, legal writer, Adam 
Liptak, wrote in an analytical piece that the treatment of the aliens 
inverted the foundational principles of the American legal system. 
The secrecy that pervaded the alien sweep—even wives were not 
told where their missing husbands were—is the sort of thing that usually 
arouses the press. But with some honorable exceptions, the detentions 
were not treated as a major story. Again, I wonder why. 
One reason for the relatively tepid response to the incursions on 
civil liberties since 9/11 is that they have on the whole been directed at 
either marginal figures or those with whom Americans on the whole do 
not readily identify. There has not been a case, as there was during 
30 New York Times, 403 U.S. at 728 (Stewart, J., concurring). 
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World War I, when well-known figures such as Eugene Debs were 
imprisoned by the Wilson administration. Editors are not going to see 
Jose Padilla as a person with whom readers or viewers can readily 
identify. But the principle the Bush administration seeks to establish in 
his case—that a President can jail any American indefinitely without a 
trial—is what matters. 
Another reason may be that the interests of the press itself have not 
been directly attacked. A case like the Pentagon Papers, in which the 
press's freedom is at issue, always gets more attention from editors. 
Justice William J. Brennan, Jr., who was one of the press's great 
friends, once chided the press for crying doom or fascism whenever it 
lost even a minor case in the courts. 
Finally the press, like politicians and the rest of us, were so 
traumatized by 9/11 that we felt it right to unite behind the President. 
That urge was so strong that we hardly reacted when Attorney General 
Ashcroft told us that dissent and concern about civil liberties were 
unpatriotic. It was not an offhand statement by Ashcroft. In his 
prepared testimony for the Senate Judiciary Committee he said, "To 
those who scare peace-loving people with phantoms of lost liberty; my 
message is this: Your tactics only aid terrorists—for they erode our 
national unity and diminish our resolve. They give ammunition to 
America's enemies."3i I know of no other Attorney General in my 
lifetime who has expressed such contempt for First Amendment values. 
The impulse to get on the national security team in the face of a 
terrorist threat had a particularly egregious example about a month after 
9/11, when five major television networks broadcast a taped message 
from Osama Bin Laden. You may remember that President Bush's 
national security advisor, Condoleezza Rice, got top executives of the 
television networks on a conference telephone call and urged them to 
cut inflammatory language from any future Bin Laden tapes. She also 
warned that his talks might include coded instructions to terrorists, a 
singularly unpersuasive notion since the original tapes had already been 
broadcast in Arabic by A1 Jazeera. The network executives agreed 
among themselves to broadcast only short segments of future tapes. 
Walter Isaacson of CNN said, "We're not going to step on the 
landmines [Doctor Rice] was talking about."32 A more candid 
explanation would have been, "We don't want to look unpatriotic." 
There was a similar press tendency to take its lead from the White 
House in the run-up to the Iraq War. Diligent digging would have 
31 Testimony of Attorney General John Ashcroft, Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, Dec. 6, 
2001, available at http://www.usdoj.gov/ag/testimony/2001/1206transcriptsenatejudiciarycom 
mittee.htm. 
32 Bill Carter & Felicity Barringer, Networks Agree to U.S. Request to Edit Future bin Laden 
Tapes, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 11, 2001, at B2. 
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found some of the doubts that we now know existed in the intelligence 
business about the existence of weapons of mass destruction in Iraq. If 
the press had been more critical, more independent, the public would 
not have been led so easily from Al-Qaeda to Iraq as the enemy. Led so 
easily that forty-four percent of respondents in a poll thought there were 
Iraqis among the terrorists that hit the World Trade Center on 
September 11. 
One of the earlier speakers said we are becoming more skeptical as 
time passes, and I hope that is true. I hope we are less willing to just 
unite behind the government and take for granted everything the 
government says is right. I hope that is true, but I am not yet convinced. 
I earlier quoted Justice Stewart on how we need an informed and 
free press to check the great power of the President when he invokes 
national security. To those two adjectives, I think we have to add a 
third: a courageous press. When we look back at the Pentagon Papers 
episode, it is the courage of The New York Times, and then other 
newspapers, that stands out. I have been critical of the profession I 
love, so it is only right that I now quote a ringing statement in praise of 
that profession and its courage. It is from the concurring opinion of 
Justice Hugo L. Black in the Pentagon Papers case. "Paramount among 
the responsibilities of a free press," Justice Black wrote, "is the duty to 
prevent any part of the government from deceiving the people and 
sending them off to distant lands to die of foreign fevers and foreign 
shot and shell. In my view, far from deserving condemnation for their 
courageous reporting, the New York Times, the Washington Post, and 
other newspapers should be commended for serving the purpose that the 
Founding Fathers saw so clearly. In revealing the workings of 
government that led to the Vietnam War, the newspapers nobly did 
precisely that which the Foimders hoped and trusted they would do."^^ 
The duty is not only to report with courage what underlies government 
decisions to send Americans off to die of foreign shot and shell, but to 
report govemment actions menacing the Constitutional protections that 
have kept us free. 
DEAN RUDENSTESfE; I want to thank Tony very much for that. 
If Tony felt chilled as he followed our last speaker, he might have left 
us in the deep freeze. It seems as though there are two attacks 
underway. One is from without and one is from within. Before we go 
to lunch, I thought I might read the last paragraph of Tony Lewis's last 
column that he published in the New York Times on December 15, 2001. 
If for no other reason, it is a concept or an idea that seeks to insure all of 
us that there is a remedy and it lies within ourselves. Tony wrote, "In 
33 New York Times, 403 U.S. at 717 (Black, J., concurring). 
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the end 1 believe that faith in reason will prevail. But it will not happen 
automatically. Freedom under law is hard work. If rulers cannot be 
trusted with arbitrary power, it is up to citizens to raise their voices at 
injustice."^'' And then he wrote this as his last line, "The most 
important office in a democracy," Justice Louis Brandeis said, "is the 
office of citizen." 
Thank you very much to all of you and all the guests today. 
34 Anthony Lewis, Abroad at Home: Hail and Farewell, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 15, 2001, at A31. 
